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Robert J. Rhee*
Abstract
The economic models of bargaining and tort law have not been
integrated into a coherent theory that reflects the empirical world. This
Article models the interaction of settlement dynamics and the economic
theory of negligence. It shows that tort claims are systematically devalued
during settlement relative to the legal standard. Central to this thesis is a
proper conception and accounting of cost. Cost is typically viewed as the
transaction cost of litigation processing. Cost, however, encompasses more
than this. Each dispute has a cost of resolution, defined as the discounting
effect of risk on legal valuation. A spread between the parties’ respective
costs of resolution creates an arbitrage opportunity in which the bargaining
process presents superior pricing to that of the public forum. In the typical
tort context, this cost advantage belongs to the defendant. As long as
settlement is the primary method of dispute resolution, tort law is
structurally incapable of maintaining the efficient standard of care to
which courts aspire. Under this analysis, the fault standard is both an
instrument of valuation and a cost-shifting mechanism. The theory of
negligence, then, devalues the litigation asset, thus reducing the
defendant’s liability, and settlement is the result. The effect is to promote
a system of self-regulation of accidents in the shadow of uncertain
government pricing. These functionalities connect the historical origins of
negligence to its “unexpected persistence” today. Negligence maintains the
essentially private nature of tort law even as it touches social policy and
public conscience.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article advances an economic theory that links the dispute
resolution process and the negligence standard. Despite the predominance
of settlements, we lack an integrated economic theory.1 This void in the
literature is peculiar because scholars have explored the relationship
between bargaining and other substantive fields.2 Fundamental questions

1. A check of the leading works shows no cross-fertilization between the economic theories
of tort law and bargaining. Some leading articles on the economics of bargaining are Robert Cooter,
Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal
Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973) [hereinafter Posner, Legal
Procedure]; George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). Some leading works on the economics of torts are GUIDO CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) [hereinafter Posner, Negligence].
2. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Action, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining
and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Robert H.
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have not been answered. Does settlement affect the efficiency of tort law?
Do courts and private parties apply the same valuational framework? If
not, can the claim of economic efficiency hold? Is there a connection
between a theory of value and the historical development and persistence
of the theory of negligence?
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the debate on tort theory has
been rich.3 But in the pursuit of “grand theories,”4 scholarship on the
theory of tort law has insufficiently accounted for the messy operational
processes of the justice system. Theories of tort law assume that the
judicial system sets the aspiration and works toward this goal, but the
assumption is myopic because most cases settle.5 Settlement, it is said,
occurs “in the shadow of the law.”6 Like a submerged iceberg, settlement
is the unseen part of the tort process that should not be ignored. Thus, the
tort system, it can be better said, exists in the shadow of bargaining. Its
efficiency aspiration can be achieved only within a system that settles most
disputes.
Economic theory says that courts maximize social wealth by deterring
conduct that imposes net social costs. This claim rests on an unstated
assumption that the dispute resolution process is irrelevant to the structure
of tort law. The reason is simple: standard bargaining theory posits that
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). Scholars have analyzed procedural process and transaction cost issues in
the context of tort law. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort
Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111 (1991); Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability
of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571
(2004); Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59 (1997).
3. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 211–43
(expanded ed. 2003) (discussing the emergence and impact of neoconceptualism in tort scholarship
of the 1970s); John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003)
(analyzing five dominant theories of twentieth-century tort law).
4. WHITE, supra note 3, at 284.
5. See PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE
STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 33 (2000) (“Given that so many cases were
settled out of court, the de facto operation of the negligence liability system potentially was quite
different from the de jure descriptions that the law and economics and legal literatures provide.”);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 357, 363 (3d ed. 2005) (emphasizing that
appellate literature, in studying tort law, “can be quite misleading” because it is “the tip of a huge
iceberg of cases”); Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in
Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 633 (2003) (explaining that tort theories “badly skew our
understanding of the actual legal practices by which the negligence standard receives its content”);
Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 2, at 1575 (“[T]he private systems of aggregation in our tort system
exist in a far-flung, decentralized, and under-the-radar world that rarely come to the attention of
tort jurists.”); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1212 (1992) (“The focus on trials is
somewhat misplaced, because the great majority of cases are settled, not tried.”).
6. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 997.
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settlement is struck at the expected value of judgment net of transaction
cost.7 The private and public valuations yield the same results on liability
assignment. This tidy logic explains why law-and-economics scholars
have not mined the intersection of bargaining and tort theories. The two
theories are facially complementary, and thus they pose no perceived need
to harmonize.
The economic story would end here, but a valuational framework
focusing on expected value and transaction cost is a fallacy as a matter of
positive theory.8 The framework fails to account for the valuational effect
of risk—not just the effect of individual risk preference—but the overall
risk profile:9 What is the variance of the expected outcome? What are the
parties’ attitudes toward risk? How does the prospect of a risky outcome
affect the circumstance of each party? In the empirical world, risk has a
price. Under asset pricing principles, uncertain cashflows are subject to a
risk-adjusted discount, which determines real economic value. A riskadjusted discount contradicts the efficiency claim, which assumes that
deterrence is achieved through probabilistic allocation of cost. Under a
theory of value that incorporates risk, private resolution may offer better
pricing than the public forum if a party has a lower cost of resolution than
the opponent’s, which results in superior valuation.
Commentators have long recognized the possibility that settlement may
deviate from efficient outcomes, thus imposing social cost.10 Yet the
7. Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of
Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 631 (2006) [hereinafter Rhee,
Price Theory].
8. Id. at 620–21; Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV.
193, 194–95 (2007) [hereinafter Rhee, Effect of Risk].
9. In this Article, “risk,” “uncertainty,” and “variance” are used interchangeably. The
economic literature sometimes distinguishes risk and uncertainty in that risk consists of future
outcomes that have a known distribution while uncertainty describes those that have unknown
distributions. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 233–34 (Harper & Row 1965)
(1921). This distinction is not made here because applicable probability distributions do not exist
for most legal actions. See Rhee, Price Theory, supra note 7, at 638–46. The problem is one of
reference class. In any given action, the probability distribution would change depending on the
reference class used. Indeed, there is no objective probability as to the merits of this action, if
probability truly refers to this specific action as opposed to a proposition on the class of similarly
situated actions. Accordingly, probability as an objective measure is illusory.
10. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 505–23 (arguing that settlements in securities actions
deviate from the expected outcome of trial); Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of
Litigation, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: P–Z 442, 447
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (noting that lower settlement values may be “socially wasteful”); Note,
Settling for Less: Applying Law and Economics to Poor People, 107 HARV. L. REV. 442, 444–51
(1993) (arguing that the poor tend to settle for less than the expected trial outcome); John A.
Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1820,
1835–53 (1987) (arguing that the realities of corporate behavior undermine the efficiency goal of
tort law); Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on the Divergence Between the Private and Social Motives to
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possibility has not been analyzed through an integrated economic theory
of negligence. The central thesis of this Article is that the dispute
resolution process systematically undervalues claims qua the judicially
prescribed valuation. The theory of negligence is structurally incapable of
setting the standard of care as described by the positive economic theory
of tort law. Efficiency, as defined, is impossible because the structure of
the fault system creates an arbitrage opportunity for the party who has the
lower cost of resolution.
This arbitrage connects the historical choice of negligence, which
reduced (intended or not) the liability of a burgeoning industrial enterprise,
to the current “unexpected persistence” of the fault standard,11 which has
resisted challenges from alternative ideas. Negligence maintains its
viability today, in part at least, because it is cheaper for industry. More
than any other competing idea, it creates the greatest degree of
risk—uncertainty of outcome.12 One obvious result, it is fairly observed,
is a costly pricing mechanism that requires the parties to seek information
about the value of the case. But there is another facet to the fault system
that is seen through the prism of bargaining theory. By increasing
uncertainty, the cost structure of negligence promotes settlement under
terms favorable to the party who has the lower cost of resolution. In this
respect, negligence persists because it balances the public ordering of tort
law with the essentially private ordering of a tort dispute.
II. TORT AND BARGAINING THEORIES
A. Tort Law in the Shadow of Settlement
Most resolutions of disputes are invisible to academic and judicial eyes
because they are settled without a lawsuit.13 These disputes tend to be
simple and are not worth the transaction cost of litigation or the social cost
of disrupting the community peace. Social norms and other factors,
irrelevant to liability in the strictest sense, often influence settlements.14 In
this invisible world, it is questionable whether the resolution of tort
disputes resembles the claim of efficiency in tort models. No one disputes
that legitimate claims go undiscovered or are not pursued for one reason
Settle Under a Negligence Rule, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 613, 614–16 (1997) (discussing the possibility
of divergence between settlement and social efficiency).
11. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 244–90.
12. See infra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.
13. See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 141 (1970); Marc A. Franklin et al., Accidents, Money, and the Law: A
Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1961); see also
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 4 (1991).
14. ELLICKSON, supra note 13, at 4–8; ROSS, supra note 13, at 113.

130

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 60

or another, though we may never know the extent of this phenomenon.15
Moreover, bankruptcy protection and the limited-liability shield of various
types of business entities ensure that a certain portion of tort liability is
judgment proof.16 Thus, there is an invisible corner of the tort system
where defendants “internalize far less than the full cost of losses they
inflict.”17
This Article analyzes only the visible part of the tort system—filed
civil actions. Even here the degree of transparency varies. Trials and
appeals are transparent through public records, but settlements within the
legal system are less so. Because settlements are private, the behavioral
and economic details of how settlements are struck are only partially
known,18 but there are aggregate statistical data. Among filed actions,
juridical resolutions play a small role. Only a small percentage of filed
cases ever reach trial.19 A substantial minority of cases are dismissed
through nontrial adjudication.20 A substantial majority settle.21 Although

15. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND, THE INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION
FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (1991) (“[C]laiming is a statistically unusual

behavior: many more injured people decline to claim—or never even consider claiming—than
attempt to activate the legal process.”); see also TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH
68–69 (2005); Franklin et al., supra note 13, at 10; Goldberg, supra note 3, at 554; Saks, supra note
5, at 1183.
16. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1916–23 (1991) (arguing that the corporate liability shield
should be abolished for tort liability); Siliciano, supra note 10, at 1838–40 (noting the effects of
bankruptcy protection for corporate entities); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims,
and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991) (analyzing the effect of limited liability on tort
victims).
17. Saks, supra note 5, at 1283 n.533; accord Hylton, supra note 2, at 113–14.
18. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 357 (“About the rest of the system—settlements and
claims adjustment, for example—even less is known.”).
19. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462–63 tbl.1 (2004) (listing that
from 1962 to 2002, civil trial rates in federal court declined from 11.5% to 1.8%); id. at 507 tbl.4
(listing that in a composite of twenty-two state courts, trials decreased from 36.1% in 1976 to
15.8% in 2002); Posner, Negligence, supra note 1, at 35 (noting that about 2% of accident claims
are tried); Saks, supra note 5, at 1212–13 (noting that less than 10% of cases reach trial); Franklin
et al., supra note 13, at 10 (explaining that about 3.6% of injury claims in New York City reach trial
each year); see also Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 2, at 1582–83 (showing a historical trend of
increasing settlements in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
20. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial
Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 730 tbl.7 (2004) (noting that 23.3% of contested federal civil cases
in 2000 were disposed through nontrial adjudication); David M. Trubek et al., The Cost of Ordinary
Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89 (1983) (noting that 22.5% of the cases in the study were
dismissed or received judgment on the merits without a trial).
21. Alexander, supra note 2, at 525 (noting that rate of settlement is likely 60% to 70% of
filed cases); Hadfield, supra note 20, at 730 tbl.7 (noting that 68.7% of federal civil cases in 2000
were settled).
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appellate decisions are the empirical fodder of tort theory,22 they constitute
a minute fraction of filed actions.
Given the predominance of settlement, one could argue that a weak
form of the Coasean vision of the law’s irrelevance exists.23 That said,
judicial administration of tort law cannot be marginalized on the basis of
statistical infrequency. Cases settle within the legal framework of the
litigation process.24 Conversely, the settlement process cannot be viewed
as a unidirectional law and effect. Settlements affect the law or its
efficacy. Because trial is a rarity, tort theory must address the reality that
even with filed cases the costs of accidents are priced and allocated in the
opaque realm of private agreements.25
B. Positive Economic Theory of Negligence
The positive economic theory of tort law is well known. In A Theory
of Negligence, Richard Posner argued that negligence is grounded in
economic efficiency and that liability assignment depends on a
cost–benefit analysis.26 The centerpiece of this analysis is the Hand
Formula, noted as PL > B.27
Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident if it
occurs by the probability of occurrence yields a measure of
the economic benefit to be anticipated from incurring the
costs necessary to prevent the accident. The cost of
prevention is what Hand meant by the burden of taking
precautions against the accident. It may be the cost of
installing safety equipment or eliminating the activity. If the
cost of safety measures or curtailment—whichever cost is
lower—exceeds the benefit in accident avoidance to be
gained by incurring that cost, in economic terms society
would be better off to forgo accident prevention.28

22. See, e.g., Posner, Negligence, supra note 1, at 29 (analyzing a sample of 1,528 appellate
cases).
23. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (arguing that
the factors on which court decisions turn are irrelevant to economists and that it is always possible
to modify legal rights through market transactions).
24. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 950; see also Franklin et al., supra note 13,
at 13 (stating that about 84% of claimants achieved some recovery).
25. FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 5, at 22 (“A better understanding of the de facto
operation of the negligence system, therefore, serves as the basis for more accurate theoretical
discussions of the relative efficiency of negligence and no-fault legal systems.”).
26. Posner, Negligence, supra note 1, at 34.
27. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). In Hand’s formula,
P equals probability, L equals injury, and B equals burden. Id. The Hand Formula has achieved
iconic status in tort law, thanks in large part to Posner, and it has been the muse of an enormous
volume of commentary. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1999, 2000–01 (2007).
28. Posner, Negligence, supra note 1, at 32.
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In The Economic Structure of Tort Law, Posner and William Landes
provided a formal economic model of tort law.29 The model recognizes
that uncertainty is the governing condition of a dispute. Consequence from
action is uncertain: upon an accident, the liability boundary is uncertain;
upon suit, the juridical outcome is uncertain. A meritorious lawsuit is
neither certain to lose nor to win. According to Posner and Landes,
uncertainty is accounted for through the concept of expected utility,
calculated as the sum of the probability distribution of mutually exclusive
states of outcome.30 Because risk neutrality is assumed, risk is not a factor
of value.31 Value is calculated as the expected value of the future juridical
outcome.32
With expected utility defined, a supply–demand model is constructed
to determine the most efficient standard of care.33 The demand curve PL
is downward sloping and decreases at a marginal product of care. The
supply curve B is upward sloping and increases at a marginal cost of
care.34 The intersection of the supply–demand curves yields the lowest
total cost corresponding to the optimal standard of care.35 Stated
differently, the liability boundary is the point at which the marginal cost
of the accident equals the marginal cost of precaution. Thus, the Hand
Formula, revised as a marginal cost analysis, is the “correct economic
standard of negligence.”36
The Hand Formula factors, viewed in isolation, are subject to rational
assessments. First, probability is subjective,37 but for the purpose of
29. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1.
30. Id. at 55.
31. See id. at 56–57.
32. See id. at 55–56.
33. Id. at 59–60.
34. Id. at 60.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 87. Landes and Posner noted: “Hand was purporting only to make explicit what had
long been the implicit meaning of negligence.” Id. at 85. Other economic theories of tort law are
consistent in the application of cost–benefit analysis. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 19–21.
However, the efficiency claim is not without its critics. Posner and Landes respond that their
interest is “in explaining, rather than defending, the common law of torts.” LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 1, at 9. This claim has been criticized as hiding a normative preference for wealth
maximization. See J. M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1448–59 (1987) (book review). Critics and proponents agree, however, that
the efficiency claim cannot be empirically verified. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 20; see
FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 5, at 18 (explaining that attempts to measure the relative
efficiencies “have fallen well short of expectations”); Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic
Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1607 (1997) (“It is also exceedingly difficult to
contradict or disprove this positive economic theory.”); see also Anita Bernstein, Whatever
Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303, 319–22 (2005) (noting that law-andeconomics theories suffer from a lack of predictive power and empirical confirmation).
37. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 55. Posner and Landes did not explore the
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argument here, the assumption, unless otherwise stated, is that the parties
share similar views of expected value and this view is consistent with an
assumption of rational expectation.38 Second, with respect to loss, courts
routinely assign value to loss at trial, and thus loss value is based on the
expected juridical outcome. Finally, the cost of precaution is perhaps the
most assessable factor. Each discrete level of precaution is typically
measurable through market pricing of materials and labor, subject to
foreseeability of the harm and feasibility of the precautionary method. For
example, there are commoditized prices for rescue efforts at sea,39 bargees
in boats,40 radios in tugboats,41 lifeguards at hotel pools,42 fuel tank
designs,43 electric power lines serving railway cars,44 and fences in cricket
yards.45
The problem is that value is determined relative to some governing
conceptual framework held either by the parties or the broader society.
Where market price is available, one’s value assignment is compared
against the market price to determine whether one wants to transact. But
where market pricing is absent and the parties are coerced to transact, as
in a lawsuit, the market benchmark is lacking and relative valuation
assumes greater importance because a transaction must ultimately occur.
In a legal dispute, there are three participants who determine value:
plaintiffs, defendants, and courts. Absent a private agreement on value
between the parties, courts are the default arbiters of value. Herein are
important unsettled questions. Do the perceptions of value among these
heterogeneous participants differ? If so, what is the impact on the standard
of care? And, who really sets the price of deterrence? The economic model
of tort law does not explicitly address these questions, but by its silence,
the implied answer must be that the process of dispute resolution is
irrelevant.

implication of inductive probability. See Rhee, Price Theory, supra note 7, at 642–50 (discussing
the implication of the subjective nature of probability on legal analysis).
38. Most economic models assume rational expectation, which means that “expectations
contain no systematic bias, that is, the subjective expectations correspond to the objective
frequencies of the random event.” Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22
(1982).
39. See Gardner v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 1962).
40. See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1947).
41. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
42. See Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 467 (Cal. 1970).
43. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 377–78 (Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
44. See Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93, 93–94 (N.Y. 1919).
45. See Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) (U.K.).
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C. Economic Theory of Legal Bargaining
The economic analysis of legal bargaining traces back to Ronald
Coase’s landmark work on transaction cost economics, The Problem of
Social Cost.46 Coase argued that in a world of zero transaction costs and
“conditions of perfect competition,” parties would privately bargain to
efficiently allocate economic production, regardless of the initial
assignment rights.47 “With costless market transactions, decisions of the
courts concerning liability for damage would not affect the allocation of
resources.”48 The broadest lesson is that the economic efficiency in any
transaction is dependent, at least in part, on its transaction cost, a concept
readily portable to legal valuation and the settlement process.49
The powerful idea of transaction cost economics became the theoretical
precursor to the prevailing economic model of legal bargaining.50 Here
again Landes and Posner have been leading thinkers. Landes applied
Coase’s ideas to settlement behavior in criminal cases.51 The key factors
driving settlement, Landes suggested, are the parties’ assessments of the
probability of prevailing, their risk preferences, the amount or stake in
controversy, and transaction costs.52 Posner later refined this analysis:
The plaintiff’s minimum offer is the expected value of the
litigation to him plus his settlement costs, the expected value
of the litigation being the present value of the judgment if he
wins, multiplied by the probability (as he estimates it) of his
winning, minus the present value of his litigation expenses.
The defendant’s maximum offer is the expected cost of the
litigation to him and consists of his litigation expenses, plus
the cost of an adverse judgment multiplied by the probability
as he estimates it of the plaintiff’s winning (which is equal to
one minus the probability of his winning), minus his
settlement costs.53
46. Coase, supra note 23.
47. Id. at 6, 15; see also Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and
Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 73 (1968) (concluding that the Coasean analysis
is an “admirable tool” for resource allocation decisions); Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of
Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972) (offering a critical overview of the Coase theorem).
48. Coase, supra note 23, at 10.
49. See Calabresi, supra note 47, at 68 (“[I]f one assumes rationality, no transaction costs,
and no legal impediments to bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the
market by bargains.”).
50. Landes credits Coase with providing the theoretical precursor to legal bargaining theory.
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 102 n.61 (1971).
51. See id. at 61.
52. Id. at 101–02.
53. Posner, Legal Procedure, supra note 1, at 418; see Alan E. Friedman, Note, An Analysis
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Settlement is conditioned on the defendant’s maximum settlement
value being greater than the plaintiff’s minimum value.54 The range
between the defendant’s maximum settlement value and the plaintiff’s
minimum settlement value is the “contract zone.” The larger this contract
zone, the greater is the possibility of settlement. Probability assessment
and transaction costs are key factors.55 This basic model comports with an
intuitive understanding of a cost–benefit analysis. Let P be probability of
favorable judgment, L expected liability amount, T transaction cost for
each party, and B aggregate transaction cost for both parties. Assume that
L and T are the same for both parties but that the parties’ probability of
success differs. Trial should result only if there is no contract zone.56 This
condition is expressed as the trial inequality: Pp x L – T > Pd x L + T. The
difference between the parties’ probability assessments can be noted as P)
= Pp – Pd. By rearranging the trial inequality, one derives P)L > B. The
selection of trial and settlement is a product of a cost–benefit analysis.
Cost is limited to the cash-reducible expenses of litigation processing,
primarily attorney fees. Because risk neutrality is the governing
framework,57 adjustments to value are made based on individual risk
preferences. A risk-averse person would accept a discount from the riskneutral valuation up to an indifference point. A risk-seeking person would
require a premium. Because preferences are matters of one’s peculiar
disposition, the risk-neutral framework serves as a theoretical reference
point from which individual behavior may vary according to preference.
This bargaining model “is so satisfying that it is only a small step to
assume that it is descriptively accurate, even though neither its
assumptions nor its conclusions have been empirically verified.”58 Thus,
the bargaining model is both a positive prediction of actual settlement
behavior and a normative prescription, if only implied, to mimic the
Coasean world of private bargains, costless pricing mechanisms, and
irrelevant laws.59
of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REV. 67 (1969) (providing an earlier economic analysis). Subsequently,
courts have applied a similar economic approach. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986).
54. Posner, Legal Procedure, supra note 1, at 417.
55. See id. at 418–19.
56. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN LAW 597–98 (7th ed. Aspen 2007).
Because the direct cost of settlement is so small compared to litigation costs, it can be seen as “nil.”
See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1075 (1989).
57. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 56–57.
58. Alexander, supra note 2, at 504.
59. There is a clear judicial preference for settlement. See Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 10
(1985) (“In short, settlements rather than litigation will serve the interests of plaintiffs as well as
defendants.”); In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[A]
bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.”), aff’d, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); see
also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342–43 (1994). This normative preference is also held by
many scholars who equate a failed settlement as error. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 56, at
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D. Common Intellectual Heritage
The prevailing economic theories of tort law and bargaining are linked
by a common analysis and intellectual history. Both theories came to
prominence in the early 1970s with influential articles by leading law-andeconomics scholars,60 and they aspire to efficiency through cost
minimization. Their interplay goes like this. Assume that a defendant
injures a plaintiff, resulting in a loss of 100. The Hand Formula would
determine whether the defendant was negligent,61 but juridical resolution
is always subject to uncertainty. In one possible resolution, the parties
agree that liability is uncertain and assess (accurately, for argument’s sake)
the probability of liability at 0.5. They rationally settle at the expected
value of 50 without transaction cost. The total value of the
transaction—defendant’s payout and plaintiff’s net receipt—is 100. In the
other possible resolution, the parties go to trial. Trial may result in an allor-nothing judgment of 100 or 0. The expected value is 50, except that
each side incurs transaction costs of 20. The defendant’s expected payout
is 70, and the plaintiff’s net compensation is 30. The transaction value is
still 100. But compared to settlement, trial forces the defendant to pay out
more and the plaintiff to receive less.62 This inefficiency has no effect on
deterrence, however, because the standard of care yields the same liability
of 50. The forum of resolution is irrelevant to the question of tort
efficiency, and the question of process efficiency reduces to an accounting
of the transaction cost.
These models of settlement behaviors “predict or imply that settlement
outcomes will approximate trial outcomes.”63 When both theories are
combined, there is an elegant symmetry. Efficiency must be achieved at
1074 (finding that trials are the result of “a mistaken prediction about the outcome of a trial made
by one of the parties”); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (“A trial is a
failure.”); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 107–08 (1994) (asserting that most scholars believe
“trials represent mistakes”).
60. See supra note 1.
61. See Posner, Negligence, supra note 1, at 32.
62. See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV.
321, 327 (1988) (“Settlement is more efficient for the parties, giving them more of what they hoped
to gain at less cost.”). But see Rhee, Price Theory, supra note 7 (arguing that litigation costs are
crucial to the efficiency of pricing disputes); cf. Hay & Spier, supra note 10, at 447 (“Hence there
is a rough prima facie argument for some governmental encouragement of settlement, if the correct
terms can be arrived at.”).
63. Alexander, supra note 2, at 499. “The implicit message of the economic model is that we
do not need to be concerned about the high proportion of cases that are settled because the
outcomes of settled cases approximate the positions the parties would have occupied after a trial
on the merits.” Id. at 502.

2008]

TO RT ARBITRAG E

137

the settlement table as well as at the courthouse steps, lest the legal process
be irrelevant. The worldly uncertainties of action, consequence, and
liability are viewed through the common prism of probability. A court’s
decision depends on a probabilistic analysis of accident cost, and a private
settlement depends on a probabilistic prediction of this decision. If there
is no systematic difference between the two probability assessments—and
importantly this Article assumes none—the manner of resolution is
irrelevant, except as to the effect of transaction cost.
This logic is implied in Posner’s A Theory of Negligence. While that
article recognized that trials were “the tip-of-the-iceberg,”64 an analysis of
how the dispute resolution process influences tort theory did not follow
because, it was assumed, the dispute resolution system complements the
structure of tort law.65 The dispute resolution system decentralizes and
depoliticizes the process of allocating the costs of accidents by
incentivizing parties to investigate accidents and pursue meritorious
actions.66 Although most cases settle, this should not affect tort law
because there will be enough trials and judicial opinions to assure a
sufficient volume of information such that parties are able to predict
judicial decisions. Thus, the parties can reach “a reasonable settlement.”67
Forum irrelevance is a product of a risk-neutral valuational
framework.68 An assumption of risk neutrality is not only simplifying but
also fundamental to the theory.69 According to Landes and Posner, the
assumption of risk aversion “would give us too many degrees of freedom
in explaining the rules of tort law and would make the efficiency theory of
those rules difficult to refute (and hence to confirm),” and furthermore,
courts approach rulemaking from a risk-neutral perspective.70 This
explanation is problematic. If people are generally risk averse,71 how can
a positive model based on an assumption of risk neutrality reflect the
empirical world? Moreover, while courts may be risk neutral in
decisionmaking (after all, no court ever has a personal stake), the parties
involved invariably make decisions with unique preferences and under

64. Posner, Negligence, supra note 1, at 35.
65. See id. at 48–49.
66. See id. at 48.
67. Id.
68. See POSNER, supra note 56, at 598–99. Risk neutrality is a common assumption in a lawand-economics analysis. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 43 (3d ed. Aspen 2003).
69. See Rhee, Price Theory, supra note 7, at 635–36 (explaining that the assumption of risk
neutrality is fundamental to the standard bargaining model). Cf. Rhee, Effect of Risk, supra note
8, at 224 (“If uncertainty is the ruling condition of a lawsuit, how can risk neutrality be the standard
assumption?”).
70. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 57.
71. Id. at 56.
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varying circumstances, which collectively result in systematic and
predictable behavioral traits and choices.72
Risk preferences aside, the theory of value may assume a degree of risk
aversion of market participants even as preferences may vary considerably.
Large risk markets exist because their price structures are based on the
premise that risk-bearers should be compensated. For example, higher
variance of a future cashflow requires a higher rate of return to capital
providers, and higher risk of future loss in an insurance transaction
requires a greater loss reserve, thus increasing premium price.73 In this
light, it is nonsensical to assume that parties in a legal dispute are
indifferent to risk when risk is the defining condition of a dispute. If there
is no variance of outcome, there would be certainty, which is to say that
a lawsuit would never arise.74 Uncertainty begets the action.
The assumption of risk neutrality in both preference and the theory of
value ultimately assumes away the most difficult aspect of analyzing how
the tort and dispute resolution processes work together. It maintains the
consistency of valuation that is a condition of the efficiency claim. The
efficiency argument fails if the standard of care floats unpredictably with
the outcomes of private bargains or, more profoundly, if there is a
systematic tendency that pulls value away from the intrinsic (judicial)
value.75 An absence of consistent valuations creates the possibility of
exploiting price differences between forums. Thus, the unexplored
intellectual territory is a model of the valuational relationship between
litigation and settlement on the theory of negligence.
72. See Hylton, supra note 2, at 117 (“The failure to examine risk aversion and other
considerations which would require specification of the preferences of actors results in a focus on
‘wealth-maximizing’ or ‘efficient,’ rather than ‘utility-maximizing’ solutions to the problem of
controlling accidents through private litigation.”); Note, supra note 10, at 447 (“The law and
economics literature analyzing the settlement decision often eliminates this very real phenomenon
from consideration by assuming that the parties are risk neutral. Moreover, when scholars do
consider risk aversion, their analyses generally fail to account for any systemic differences in
degrees of risk aversion due to wealth disparities.” (footnote omitted)).
73. See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 439 n.12 (2005) (“In 2003,
worldwide insurance premium volume was about $3 trillion . . . .”) [hereinafter Rhee, Terrorism
Risk]; Robert J. Rhee, Catastrophic Risks and Governance after Hurricane Katrina: A Postscript
to Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 585 n.27 (2006) (“[A]s of
December 31, 2004, the capitalization of the global financial market was $37.3 trillion . . . .”)
[hereinafter Rhee, Catastrophic Risks and Governance].
74. Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 17 (“In litigation, as in gambling, agreement over the
outcome leads parties to drop out.”). On the flip side of this point, the one circumstance in which
trial is a certainty is when a party has bribed the judge and jury and is certain of the outcome.
75. See Rhee, Price Theory, supra note 7, at 642–50 (explaining that probabilistic settlements
based on decisional law and predictions of judicial outcomes are impossible); see also Issacharoff
& Witt, supra note 2, at 1601 (“It is possible to question the assumption that decisional law is
sufficient to guide settlement in tort suits.”).
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III. PRICING LEGAL DISPUTES
A. Hedging Risk
The intuitive understanding of expected value in bargaining has
remained remarkably durable over the years.76 But the model has recently
been criticized, and some of its fundamental assumptions have been
questioned.77 The criticism starts with the point that a disputed right in a
civil action is an asset to the plaintiff and a liability to the defendant.78 This
suggests that the parties are investors in a financial project.79 Although the
asset and liability are illiquid, the essential characteristic of a lawsuit for
money damages reflects an anticipated future cashflow subject to
uncertainty.80 Thus, financial economics is the most appropriate economic
tool to use to analyze these lawsuits.81 In financial economics, portfolio
theory and asset pricing theory have direct relevance.
Portfolio theory posits that there is a valuational relationship between
risk and return. The premise of the theory is simple: investors should
consider “yield to be a good thing; risk, a bad thing; gambling, to be
avoided.”82 If risk is a bad thing, the rule of investment must be that “the
investor does (or should) consider expected return a desirable thing and
variance of return an undesirable thing.”83 This rule does not prescribe that
risk should be avoided.84 Rather, return should be maximized at the lowest
76. See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 1, at 12–13 (adopting the expected-value formulation
of discounting with probability); Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 56, at 1075 (discussing how the
expected gains and losses of parties represent their subjective threat values in bargaining).
77. See Rhee, Price Theory, supra note 7, at 668 (“Under this framework, the selection of
litigation and trial can be analyzed with greater complexity and avoids algebraic reductions that
simply do not correspond to reality.”).
78. “Asset” and “liability” are used in the economic sense of those terms and not the
accounting sense.
79. See Rhee, Effect of Risk, supra note 8, at 195–96.
80. See id. at 196.
81. See id. at 195. Finance theory fundamentally deals with the incorporation of risk into the
theory of value. See STEPHEN A. ROSS, NEOCLASSICAL FINANCE 1 (2005). Some scholars have also
applied financial economic principles to the analysis of tort law. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda,
Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in Mass Tort Class Actions, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 796–828
(2002); Robert J. Rhee, The Application of Finance Theory to Increased Risk Harms in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 172–95 (2004).
82. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 91 (1952); see also RICHARD A.
BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 557 (8th
ed. 2006) (“[R]isk is a bad thing . . . .”). Variance is a measure of dispersion about the expected
return, and is the measure of risk. Markowitz, supra, at 89.
83. Markowitz, supra note 82, at 77.
84. In an efficient market—one marked by an absence of arbitrage opportunities—return
cannot be enhanced without taking on additional risk. See SERGIO M. FOCARDI & FRANK J.
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risk. Portfolio theory posits that for every level of expected return, a
portfolio can be structured to achieve that return at the lowest risk.85
Asset pricing theory posits that the value of a firm is the sum of the
“expected cash flow discounted at a rate that reflects the riskiness of the
cash flow.”86 A firm’s cost of capital is the discount rate.87 Before the
advent of asset pricing models, this cost could not be quantified. Because
it would be extraordinarily complicated to compare the risk of a particular
asset against all other assets in the market, the common reference point is
the market return.88 The greater the variance of a firm’s return relative to
the market benchmark, the greater is its risk. Greater risk means higher
cost of capital, which discounts the firm’s value.
Portfolio theory and asset pricing theory link the concepts of risk and
expected value into a generally accepted theory of value. The former says
that risk is a “bad thing” and that one should be paid to bear it. The latter
says that greater risk reduces asset value as a result of the greater
discounting of cashflow. From these principles, several working rules of
legal valuation are derived: (1) risk, defined as the rational belief in
variance of outcome from expectation, decreases the plaintiff’s asset value
of the lawsuit and increases the defendant’s liability value, and (2) the
valuational framework adjusts the expected value of a judgment based on
the overall risk profile.
Simply, the dispute resolution process is an exercise in risk
management wherein risk and return are traded. An example proves this
important point. Assume similarly situated, risk-neutral parties and zero
transaction cost. In the first hypothetical, both parties believe that the
probability of liability is 0.5 with a judgment of 100. The expected value
is 50. Under conventional thought, both parties would be indifferent
between settlement and trial because litigation would be cost free. Assume,
however, that the value of the lawsuit is governed by the theory of value
wherein risk bearers are rewarded (similar to the securities or insurance
markets). In other words, while a person may be risk neutral, the
prevailing theory of value incorporates risk as a factor of value.89 In this
FABOZZI, THE MATHEMATICS OF FINANCIAL MODELING AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 393
(2004) (suggesting that sustainable arbitrage opportunities cannot exist in an efficient market).
85. This concept that diversification reduces risk is not new, and it is found in interesting
places. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 1 (“My ventures
are not in one bottom trusted, Nor to one place; nor is my whole estate Upon the fortune of this
present year. Therefore, my merchandise makes me not sad.”).
86. THOMAS E. COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF
COMPANIES 63 (3d ed. 2000).
87. See id. at 311.
88. See id. at 307–08.
89. A risk-neutral person may be indifferent to risk, but he is never indifferent to value. A
sum certain and a lottery may have the same expected value, but a risk-neutral person would prefer
the cashflow that has the greater value even though he is indifferent to the underlying risk. Also,
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case, settlement would be the superior proposition even assuming zero
transaction cost. The parties would settle at the expected value of 50,
which yields the superior value proposition. This is obvious, but the
underlying transactional mechanics of achieving this result are more
nuanced.
This Solomonic settlement is achieved through an implied hedging
transaction. Because unnecessary risk is a bad thing, it should be avoided.
By settling, each party executes a hedging strategy that eliminates risk and
extracts the expected value of trial. The hedge goes like this: if the court
finds liability and awards 100, the plaintiff agrees to pay the defendant 50;
in turn, if there is no liability, the defendant agrees to pay the plaintiff 50.
Each party issues a put option to protect the other against the contingency
of a negative outcome. This hedging strategy maximizes expected value
and eliminates risk; the pre-bet uncertainty of [0, 100] is reduced to a postbet certainty of 50. Table 1 summarizes these bets.

This betting heuristic conceptualizes how parties actually mitigate risk.
Here, settlement is achieved with the assumption of zero transaction cost.
The implication is that the influence of risk on settlement behavior is
independent of expected value and transaction cost considerations.
Consider a more complicated hypothetical. The plaintiff assesses the case
outcomes as [0, 100] and thus seeks to execute the above hedging strategy.
On the other hand, the defendant believes that liability is certain, but the
judgment is variable with expected outcomes [25, 75]. The expected value
is 50 for both parties, but obviously the risks are different. Applying our
hedging heuristic, the plaintiff would value the case lower than the
defendant. Both parties would attempt to mitigate risk without, initially,

one can be risk neutral yet behave in a risk-averse manner consistent with risk aversion. For
example, corporations are typically considered risk neutral, yet they are significant purchasers of
insurance. See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 171–73 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing why corporations would purchase insurance). One
reason that a corporation purchases insurance is that insurance reduces the volatility of cashflow
and thus reduces the corporation’s cost of capital. See infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
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a concession in expected value. The plaintiff would offer a bet of 50,
which would fix her return at 50. But this bet would have no effect on the
defendant’s position. From the defendant’s perspective, the potential
outcomes are [25, 75]. If the court awards 25, he must pay the plaintiff 50,
resulting in a net cash outflow of 75. If the court awards 75, the plaintiff
would pay him 50, resulting in a net cash outflow of 25. The two
possibilities result in payouts of [25, 75], the same expected result if no bet
had been placed at all. To hedge his risk completely, the defendant must
bet 25.
The defendant’s position is the constraint. At his maximum betting
amount of 25, he eliminates risk and fixes his return at 50. But at this bet
the plaintiff’s returns from her perspective remain variable [25, 75].90
Table 2 shows this residual risk.

This analysis simply restates the obvious starting point: the plaintiff
views her case to be higher variance. The plaintiff has two choices: litigate
further or “sell” the residual risk at settlement.91 A “sale” constitutes a
trading of expected return for risk. Keeping with the betting heuristic, the
plaintiff would offer the defendant superior betting odds. In essence, the
defendant would be paid to assume the plaintiff’s residual risk and thus
would become a compensated risk-bearer.92 Here, the net risk differential
between the planitiff’s and defendant’s perceptions of risk reduces the
settlement value below its expected value even if the parties agree on the
90. If she wins her case at 100, she would give the defendant 25 for a net return of 75. If she
loses her case, she would receive 25 from the defendant for a net return of 25.
91. See Rhee, Effect of Risk, supra note 8, at 239–46 (discussing how the selection of trial
and settlement is made).
92. On the extreme end, the plaintiff may offer the defendant 1:3 odds on the defendant’s 25
bet, meaning that the defendant would wager 25 in return for the plaintiff’s wager of 75. In this
transaction, the plaintiff would eliminate risk and fix her return at the expected value of 25, and the
defendant would then have a variable return [0, 50]. The defendant would agree to a variable (risky)
return because he would reduce the expected value from 50 to 25.
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expected value. After the hedges are executed, rational settlement is
predicted to be struck somewhere in the range of 25 to 50, with an
equitable midpoint of 37.5.
B. Risk-Adjusted Pricing
Expected value states the quantity of expectation but not its quality.93
Various facets of risk influence the value assigned to the lawsuit as an
asset or a liability. These concepts are represented in Figure 1.

The y-axis represents the variance (F) associated with one’s
expectation of outcome. The x-axis represents the ratio of the probability
difference between the parties multiplied by the expected judgment
amount (P)L) (the measure of the parties’ disagreement) over the
aggregate transaction cost B. Each party has a unique selection horizon, a
continuum of indifference points along the matrix of probability and
variance, that delineates the division in the preference for trial and
settlement. The selection horizon is the reference benchmark from which

93. Scholars have equated the calculation of expected value to asset valuation. See Bradford
Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 178 (1990)
(equating expected value to a discounted cashflow analysis); Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H.
Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267,
1273 (2006) (equating expected value to a net present value calculation). This understanding is
incomplete. Asset valuation requires a two-step process: (1) project the expected cashflow, (2)
discount it to calculate a true economic value. The first step considers the quantity of the return
(what is the expected value of this project?), and the second step assesses its quality (what is the
riskiness of this expectation?). See Rhee, Effect of Risk, supra note 8, at 202–04.
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value is determined. Based on an assessment of risk and expected value,
if the assessment point lies to the left of the selection horizon, meaning the
person prefers settlement based on the assessment of risk and expected
value, then she would offer a discount measured as the distance between
the assessment point and the selection horizon.
Under the standard model, the slope of the selection horizon H is
vertical, meaning that risk has no influence on the choice between
settlement and trial. The sole determinant of the choice of trial or
settlement is the difference in the expected value weighed against
transaction cost. If the selection ratio (P)L)/B is greater than 1.0, the
parties’ difference on valuation is greater than the potential cost savings
and thus trial would result. Conversely, if the selection ratio is less than
1.0, rational parties would settle because their difference is smaller than
the transaction cost.
This standard model is unrealistic and thus irrelevant. If risk influences
the value of a lawsuit, the slope of the selection horizon must be positive
to some degree (H* in Figure 1). The most likely scenario for settlement
is when P) is low and F is high—the upper left quadrant represents the
point that is furthest from the indifference points along the selection
horizon. This is intuitively obvious. If the parties agree on expected
outcome and risk is very high, then they would opt out of the judicial
process because it could produce a result that may significantly (possibly
arbitrarily) deviate from the mutual expectation. Conversely, if the
disagreement is high and each party views the risk as low (i.e., the lower
right quadrant of the matrix), then they would be confident in their
assessments and would opt for a public valuation. In between these
extremes, there are varying degrees of probability and variance and
preferences for trial and settlement. The continuum of indifference that
points along this matrix governs choice and value.
Based on this simple framework, there are three questions that must be
asked to determine each person’s discount or premium. Where on the xaxis does the selection horizon cross (the x-intercept)? What is the slope
of the selection horizon? Where is the case assessment point? These
questions relate to three variables: (1) the cost of risk preference Cp; (2) the
cost of variance Cv; and (3) the cost of risk differential Cr.
1. Cost of Risk Preference
Risk preference is an endogenous measure of one’s predisposition
toward risk. The cost of risk aversion is the price a party is willing to pay
to avoid risk given the stake.94 The preference may change with the stake
94. See Steinman v. Hicks, 352 F.3d 1101, 1104 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“That
discounted loss would be the actuarial value of the policy, and a risk-neutral person would pay no
more. In fact he would never buy insurance, because there is always a loading charge.”).
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due to the diminishing marginal utility of money. For example, as I write
this Article, my indifference point between a certain dollar sum and an
equal chance lottery for $2,000 is probably in the range of $700,
suggesting a cost of risk aversion of 30%, which coincidentally enough is
approximately the cost of insurance.95 Across a broad range of stakes, most
people are probably risk averse in the range of 10% to 50%.96 In litigation,
individuals are generally risk averse to some degree.97
2. Cost of Variance
The cost of variance is an exogenous measure of how a quantum of risk
discounts value given the opportunity cost. In the litigation context, both
the asset and liability of the ambiguous right in question are funded by
capital, and the cost of variance measures its opportunity cost. For firms,
a legal liability imparts a capital cost because it must be funded.98 The cost
of capital is an economic cost charged against the firm’s value given the
riskiness of its return. For an individual plaintiff, the cost of variance is the
opportunity cost of the stake at issue. The cost differs from the time value
of money (from a delay in payment), though this must be a factor. The
time value of money factor suggests that in most cases the plaintiff’s cost
of variance, at minimum, approximates the defendant’s because a plaintiff
can achieve a market return. But there is more to the plaintiff’s cost of
variance. When capital is scarce or difficult to raise, the cost of capital
becomes greater.99 This principle applies to individuals as well. Accident
95. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
96. See infra note 159.
97. See infra note 159 (10% to 50% loading charge for insurance).
98. Another way to think about this cost is to consider the price of liability transfer to a thirdparty buyer. If a defendant seeks to bundle its lawsuits into a pool of potential liabilities, the price
the defendant must pay to a buyer of the pool is the expected value of the liabilities plus profit. The
profit to a third party reflects the defendant’s cost to transfer the liabilities. Similarly, by holding
the liability, one expects that the firm also incurs a cost.
99. The cost of variance is driven by exogenous circumstances vis-à-vis endogenous
predispositions. An example serves the point. Consider the case of an insurer with $100 million in
capital. The insurer approaches business in a risk-neutral manner (indeed, a risk-averse or riskseeking insurer would find itself quickly out of business). Although the insurer has a risk-neutral
outlook, it would never underwrite $500 million of Florida hurricane risk even if the actuarial risk
has been properly assessed (and even if regulations allow it). The insurer would act as if it was risk
averse because the cost of capital would increase such that the premiums charged, to achieve the
return necessitated by the increased capital cost, would be infeasible in a competitive market. The
amount of investment in Florida hurricane risk has nothing to do with a predisposition toward risk;
rather, it is governed by economic limitations of the valuational construct at work. The risk, if
undertaken, would result in a significant increase in the cost of capital, which would reduce the
value of the firm. Similarly, in the case of an individual, a person may be risk averse by, say, 30%,
given the stake. If, however, the circumstances were that the funds are needed to receive medical
care, the opportunity cost is great and would lead to behavior that resembles greater risk aversion.
Thus, given a particular risk preference, the cost of variance measures the rate of discount per
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victims often confront capital-scarce situations. One can easily envision
a plaintiff’s inability to work, pay bills, or obtain care or services, which
could lead to a steady march into the vicinity of insolvency.100 These
circumstances create the possibility of lost opportunity of capital, which
imposes a real cost on the value of the case.101 This cost, reflected in a rate
of discount per quantum of risk, is difficult to quantify, but one should not
be blind to the fact that it exists and affects value in practice.102
3. Cost of Risk Differential
Thus far, the discussion has assumed that the quantum of risk would be
perceived similarly between the parties. In most cases, however, one
expects that the parties would differ. In the typical tort action, for example,
the parties value different transactions even as they are tied together in a
common dispute and view the facts and laws similarly. Defendants are
typically repeat players.103 They reduce the unique risk of variance of each
case by holding a portfolio of cases.104 The portfolio produces a smooth
stream of cash outflows. The quantum of risk is that of the portfolio. On
the other hand, an individual plaintiff is subject to the unique risk of a
single outcome and cannot mitigate this risk other than through the implied
series of hedging transactions described in Part III.A. Thus, even though
the parties may share the same view of the facts and laws such that the
probability may be similarly viewed, the perception of variance cannot be
the same because in reality each party assesses different risks.105
quantum of risk.
100. See Note, supra note 10, at 449.
101. Indirect evidence of this increased capital cost is seen by observing a victim’s borrowing
costs before the accident and after. One can reasonably surmise that this capital cost would increase
if underwriting were individually tailored.
102. See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 5, at 11 (“The largest cost to injured workers
probably was the cost of court delays, which could last up to five years.”).
103. A number of scholars have noted the advantage of repeat play. See ROSS, supra note 13,
at 214; Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53 BUFF.
L. REV. 1369, 1396 (2006); Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 2, at 1581–83, 1599–1602.
104. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 63 (1996) (noting that individual cases are “highrisk, . . . unpredictable, and sometimes bizarre”).
105. This theory of litigation risk is empirically seen. I find Laurence Ross’s observation, in
Settled Out of Court, of the differences between insurance companies and claimants particularly
insightful:
The claimant contemplating settlement or litigation is faced with a calculus of
probabilities. Settlement offers a known award with certainty whereas litigation
offers an unknown award with an unknown probability, although both the award
and probability may be estimated by the experienced attorney. In other words,
litigation involves not only additional processing costs from the claimant’s
viewpoint; it also involves a gamble that may be totally lost. By taking many such
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With these concepts in mind, Figure 2 illustrates the effects of risk
preference and case assessment on value. It shows a situation where the
parties share the same probability Pi, but they have different selection
horizons (HP and HD) and assessment points (SP and SD) resulting from
different assessments of case risk (Fi and Fj).

gambles in litigating large numbers of cases, the insurance company is able to
regard the choice between the certainty and the gamble with indifference. In the
words of another analyst:
Generally speaking there will often be asymmetry between the parties,
insofar as the suit is a regular, calculable element in business operations
for one of them, and a unique event for the other. It means that the former
will be . . . much less deterred by the likelihood of losing individual cases,
providing he can transfer the loss to a group of customers or clients.
ROSS, supra note 13, at 214–15 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Vilhelm Aubert,
Courts and Conflict Resolution, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 40, 45 (1967)). Ross goes on to observe:
“Ordinarily, the parties prefer negotiation partly because of its certain recovery, and the claimant
usually prefers the certain recovery even more than the insurance company, thus yielding a
discount from the expected value in litigation.” Id. at 218 (emphasis added). These empirical
observations have sound basis in financial economic theory. The differences in the costs of
resolution have a significant impact on the parties’ bargaining positions. Marc Galanter observed
that in accessing the justice system corporations enjoy significant advantages over individual
parties. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–103, 106 (1974) (discussing the various advantages of repeat
players, who are likely to be organizations such as insurance and finance companies); Galanter,
supra note 103, at 1388 (“[R]ecurrent organizational litigants . . . can adopt strategies calculated
to maximize gain over a long series of cases, even where this involves the risk of maximum loss
in some cases.”).
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Because the plaintiff’s assessment SP lies to the left of her selection
horizon HP, she prefers settlement. She is willing to pay a discount,
measured as the line (" + a) and noted as $(", a), to satisfy her preference.
The defendant is less risk averse as indicated by his selection horizon HD,
which is to the left of HP. His assessment SD lies on HD, so he is indifferent
between trial and settlement. In his independent valuation (i.e., without
regard to the plaintiff’s valuation), he neither pays a discount nor seeks a
premium. Obviously, with transparent information and relative valuation,
he would seek a discount from the plaintiff because she would settle at a
discount. With expected value and transaction cost being the same for both
parties, settlement is possible only if this condition holds: P x L – $(", a)
– T # P x L + T. This inequality reduces to 0 # $(", a) + B. Thus, the
contract zone is the aggregate transaction cost plus the risk-adjusted
discount.
The discount $(", a) has two components: a discount $(a) based on the
difference between the relative cost of risk aversion, and a discount $(")
based on the different perceptions of risk even when the parties share the
same view of probability. Consider first the cost of risk aversion. The
location of the selection horizon (the x-intercept) represents the party’s
risk preference given the stake. While risk aversion suggests a diminishing
marginal-utility curve, and it is typically so presented, risk aversion here
is presented as a fixed point given the stake. More risk aversion shifts the
selection horizon to the right, decreasing the zone of preference for trial.
Less risk aversion shifts it to the left. The relative cost of risk aversion is
measured by the distance between the x-intercepts of the selection
horizons, which is line a. Assume that the plaintiff shares the same risk
preference as the defendant such that HP 6 HD.106 The line a reduces to
zero, and the discount $(a) becomes nil, but the discount $(") remains.
Consider next the cost of risk differential. The plaintiff views the case
as riskier than the defendant (compare Fi and Fj). The discount $(")
measures this risk differential. Assume that the parties retain their original
selection horizons HD and HP but that the plaintiff’s assessment merges
into the defendant’s such that SP 6 SD.107 They now share the same view of
probability and variance. In this case, the line " reduces to zero, and the
discount $(") become nil, but the discount $(a) remains.
Lastly, consider the cost of variance. The slope of the selection horizon
measures the degree a given quantum of risk affects the discount. Low cost
of variance results in a higher slope value and vice versa. A risk-neutral
person with an infinite supply of capital would have a vertical selection
horizon that rests on the selection ratio of 1.0. All other persons would
have a sloping selection horizon. Figure 3 illustrates this principle.
106. See supra Figure 2.
107. See supra Figure 2.
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If a party has the selection horizon H with assessment S, she prefers
trial because S lies to the right of the indifference point. Accordingly, she
would seek a premium p to settle. Assume that the case assessment and
risk preference does not change but that the slope of the selection horizon
changes. If the cost of variance becomes higher, the slope of the selection
horizon is lowered to H*. Because S now lies to the left of H*, this
precipitates a change in preference from trial to settlement. She now would
offer a discount d to settle. Probability, variance, and risk preference have
remained the same, except that the cost of variance increased, resulting in
a lower valuation.
C. Cost of Resolution
The above examples assume that both parties hold the same view of
probability and expected value. Yet three factors of one’s risk
profile—cost of risk aversion, cost of variance, and cost of risk
differential—dramatically affect dispute resolution. The sum of these
factors constitutes the “cost of resolution.” While transaction cost in
litigation is understood to be the cash cost of dispute processing, the cost
of resolution is a noncash item. Like the cost of capital for firms, it is
realized through the valuation assigned by each party. It is difficult to
model and conveniently ignored by assuming a risk-neutral, rational
person. To be clear, the cost of resolution is a transaction cost, but given
the general lack of recognition as a substantial cost in its own right, it is
given a different name and analyzed separately to keep the cash and
noncash costs distinct. With this cost in mind, a more robust model of
valuation is possible. The trial inequality can be written as follows: Pp x L
– T – $p > Pd x L + T + $d, where $ > 0 notes a discount and $ < 0 notes
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a premium.108
The settlement process is one in which parties seek information
transparency regarding one’s independent value as well as the opponent’s
assessment. During this discovery process, each party rationally nets out
its respective costs of resolution. What remains is a net cost that is
assigned to one party. Therefore, all else being equal, the net cost of
resolution creates a valuational divergence, yielding a bargaining
advantage for the party with the lower cost of resolution. A numeric
example illustrates the point. Assume that the parties share the same
expected value of 100 and each would incur a transaction cost of 40 in a
trial. The plaintiff’s cost of resolution is 30, while the defendant’s is 10,
and thus the net cost of resolution in favor of the defendant is 20. The
plaintiff’s minimum settlement value is thus 30, and the defendant’s
maximum settlement value is 150. With equitable bargaining, the parties
would settle at 90. This divergence from the expected value stems from the
defendant’s lower cost of resolution, resulting in a lower value of the
liability as compared to the plaintiff’s assessment of the value of her asset.
Thus, the net cost of resolution must be a transaction cost to one party
only, and it determines, in part, which party has the bargaining advantage.
D. Settlement Pressure
The above theory of how risk affects tort law is not simply an academic
inquiry. Rather, the effect is empirically seen. The most prominent
example is in Judge Posner’s opinion for the Seventh Circuit in In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.109 There, the plaintiffs contended that they were
infected with HIV from blood solids manufactured by the defendants and
brought a class action, which the district court certified.110 The defendants
filed a petition for mandamus, asking for a rescission of the order.111 In
reversing the district court, Judge Posner observed that because a class
action would substantially increase “the sheer magnitude of the risk,” the
defendants would be “under intense pressure to settle.”112
The magnitude of risk had several facets. A class action would increase
the number of plaintiffs from several hundred without a class to thousands
with a class, thus greatly increasing the potential liability.113 But of course,
this reason is no reason at all. An increase in potential liability should be

108. Because the costs of variance and risk differential always result in a discount, the a person
would seek a premium only if he had a risk-seeking preference that outweighs the other factors.
109. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
110. Id. at 1296.
111. Id. at 1294.
112. Id. at 1297–98.
113. Id. at 1298. Judge Posner offered a guess that liability could increase from about $125
million to $25 billion. Id.
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irrelevant. Class actions always increase the number of plaintiffs and
thereby the potential liability. Unless corporate wealth protection is the
policy, a potential increase in liability is an illegitimate basis to reverse
class certification.114 More interestingly, the court observed that the total
liability would depend on “the outcome of a single jury trial.”115 The
determination of liability, the court reasoned, should instead “emerge from
a decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and
different standards of liability, in different jurisdictions.”116 The
defendants, as repeat players, cannot smooth out the risk through a
diversified pool of lawsuits; instead, they are subject to the variance of a
single outcome.117 Under these circumstances, even large corporations may
face substantial “settlement pressures.”118
The reasoning in Rhone-Poulenc illustrates how the district court’s
procedural ruling fundamentally altered the risk profile and thus the value
of the tort litigation. Based on probability and expected value alone, the
defendants should have been confident in the outcome of the lawsuits
irrespective of class designation; in individual actions, the defendants had
won twelve out of thirteen cases.119 But the court observed that the
defendants could not be so confident.120
Class certification has two adverse effects on presumably risk-neutral
corporate defendants. First, because the risk cannot be reduced through a
pooling of cases, corporate defendants do not enjoy a net risk differential
as would ordinarily be the case. A class certification reverses the
diversification effect, and thus the parties are put on the same footing in
terms of outcome risk. Second, such a one-shot bet can put a corporation
in danger of insolvency, and thus corporate defendants “may not wish to
roll these dice.”121
The logic of the Rhone-Poulenc decision rested on the common
observation that parties pay a premium to eliminate the risk of a “small
probability of an immense judgment,”122 which is predicted by and
114. The Second Circuit has rejected the Seventh Circuit’s settlement pressure argument,
reasoning that the “effect of certification on parties’ leverage in settlement negotiations is a fact of
life for class action litigants. While the sheer size of the class in this case may enhance this effect,
this alone cannot defeat an otherwise proper certification.” In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust
Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001).
115. In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299.
116. Id.
117. The court noted that “the result will be robust if these further trials are permitted to go
forward, because the pattern that results will reflect a consensus, or at least a pooling of judgment,
of many different tribunals.” Id. at 1299–1300.
118. See id. at 1299.
119. Id. at 1298.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.

152

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 60

consistent with financial economic principles.123 A class certification has
the potential of increasing the firm’s cost of capital,124 and this potential
decline in market value would be fair game in the course of settlement.125
Thus, the effect of class certification was to diminish the net cost-ofresolution advantage held by the defendants and perhaps even turn the
advantage to the class plaintiffs.
Despite a premise based on economic realities of the dispute resolution
process, the reasoning in Rhone-Poulenc is flawed in at least two key
respects. First, one can be influenced by “settlement pressure” only if one
is risk averse.126 Risk aversion is an attribute of individual preference.127
For example, a corporation, as an economic entity, is typically considered
risk neutral. It is true that the agents acting within a corporation may be
risk averse, and this preference may manifest in corporate decisions.
However, the theory of agency cost suggests that agents do not have the
same personal stake in the outcome of a corporate decision as would a
shareholder.128 Indeed, shareholders are better off when agents make
investment decisions from a risk-neutral perspective. To the extent that a
decision personally affects the agent, such as promotion and salary or the
opportunity to shirk, the stake may induce an agent to act according to her
preference,129 but such stakes are not sufficiently prominent to suggest a

123. See generally Rhee, Price Theory, supra note 7 (applying principles of financial
economics to construct a pricing theory of legal disputes); Rhee, Effect of Risk, supra note 8
(analyzing how parties account for different perceptions of risk in valuation). Insurance companies,
for example, routinely provide a “danger value,” an amount in excess of the expected value of a
trial, to eliminate the exposure to a low probability, high severity claim. ROSS, supra note 13, at
202. In the front end of underwriting, a premium is based on the sum of expected value of loss,
administrative expense, and risk premium. ERIC BRIYS & FRANÇOISE DE VARENNE, INSURANCE:
FROM UNDERWRITING TO DERIVATIVES 6 (2001).
124. For an explanation of cost of capital, see supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
125. Judge Posner calls such induced settlements “‘blackmail settlements.’” In re RhonePoulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298 (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW
120 (1973)). Commentators have differed on the legitimacy of settlement pressure as a reason to
reject class certification. Compare George Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass
Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521 (1997) (arguing that contrary to the substantive goals
of tort law, the procedural system creates mass tort claims that routinely settle), with Bruce Hay &
David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and
Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000) (concluding that the risks of settlements caused by
mass tort classification have been broadly overstated).
126. J.B. Heaton, Settlement Pressure, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 264, 270 (2005).
127. Id. at 272.
128. See generally MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL
CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (2000) (applying agency theory to various organizational
forms); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (developing a theory of the
ownership structure of the firm by analyzing agency costs).
129. See Jensen, supra note 128, at 308–09.
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basis for a general theory of risk aversion in corporate decisionmaking.
Rather, corporate agents understand that shareholders can diversify
fortuitous risk, and therefore, all else being equal, they would seek to
maximize returns through a risk-neutral framework of decisionmaking.
The suggestion is not that corporations act in a way that reflects pure
risk neutrality. They may act as if they are risk averse.130 They buy
insurance, for example. A risk-neutral person would not buy insurance.131
And, as Judge Posner suggested, corporations may very well pay a risk
premium in excess of the expected value of a low-probability, highseverity lawsuit.132 They pay not because they are risk averse but because
they hedge risk to minimize financial costs.133 Some reasons to buy
insurance are that it reduces the financing cost of raising new capital and
the cost of financial distress.134 The former is a cash expense of a capital
raising transaction, and the latter is an economic cost that is reflected in
the firm’s valuation. Even for a risk-neutral entity, risk is a bad thing
because it imposes an economic cost within a valuational framework
where risk and return are traded. Thus, it is questionable whether
settlement pressure—connoting “blackmail” or some other illicit
coercion135—is a legitimate basis to deny class certification. Rather, the
predicted valuational concessions are simply a pricing matter based on the
economic realities of the circumstances created by the facts and laws.
Thus, Rhone-Poulenc expressed a value choice on the distributive nature
of the class-action rule rather than on the correctness of the price implied
by the circumstances, for price is always reflective of a voluntary
transaction between parties who presumably maximize utility.
Second, as a matter of equity and fairness, it is unclear why corporate
defendants or their shareholders are entitled to judicial protection from the
adverse valuational effects of risk. Modern portfolio theory suggests that
shareholders are diversified,136 and therefore the risk of a single,
significant adverse judgment, while bad for the particular corporation,
should be broadly spread to shareholders. The corporation, which in the
law-and-economics canon is not an entity so much as a “nexus of
contracts,”137 exists to allow investors to diversify business risk and

130. Heaton, supra note 126, at 272.
131. See Steinman v. Hicks, 352 F.3d 1101, 1104 (7th Cir. 2003).
132. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
133. Heaton, supra note 126, at 273.
134. HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 89, at 171–74.
135. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
136. For a brief discussion of modern portfolio theory, see supra notes 82–85 and
accompanying text.
137. “The ‘personhood’ of a corporation is a matter of convenience rather than reality . . . . So
we often speak of the corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or a set of implicit and explicit
contracts.” FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
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participate in the broader economy, which must include the activities that
yield accidents.138
Single-play parties, such as individual plaintiffs, always confront the
possibility of an all-or-nothing outcome of a trial, and their settlement
calculation discounts the value of the right commensurate with the risk and
the cost of variance. Repeat-play defendants, such as corporations,
typically reduce the risk of any single outcome through a pooling of
cases,139 and thus their perception of risk is typically lower than the
plaintiff’s, even if they view the facts and laws similarly. “[A]lmost
without exception the primary beneficiaries of judicial concern with
settlement pressure are large public corporations.”140 Fundamentally, the
instrumental effect of Rhone-Poulenc is to reinstate the asymmetric risk
profile between a repeat- and single-play party—a posture that without
exception yields a cost advantage for the defendant in a tort action.141
The sensitivity to risk and value seen in Rhone-Poulenc suggests a
direct connection between the theory of valuation and the underlying
structure of accident law. Because bargaining is an essential aspect of the
tort system in the aggregate, these factors of value must also affect tort
theory. The question follows: are there observable systematic differences
between plaintiffs and defendants such that we can sketch a general model
of valuation governing tort claims?
IV. TORT ARBITRAGE
A. Pro Forma Model Assumptions
Each dispute has a risk profile unique to the parties. This is not to say
that the profile in tort actions is indeterminate and cannot be modeled. Tort
disputes have a predictable profile. In the prototypical tort action, an
individual plaintiff sues a corporate or institutional defendant.142 This
CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991); accord Jenson & Meckling, supra note 128, at 310 (“It is important
to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of
contracting relationships among individuals.”).
138. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 137, at 11.
139. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 125, at 1383–84.
140. Heaton, supra note 126, at 272.
141. Cf. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 125, at 1384 (arguing that without a class action a
repeat-player defendant has the benefit of economies of scale in defending common lawsuits, which
creates an asymmetric cost advantage).
142. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 104, at 15–26 (presenting data). “[T]ort liability has
become organizational liability in the principal categories of accidental harm (auto accidents
aside): Organizations are defendants in 96% of toxic substance cases; 99% of products liability
cases; 86% of premises liability cases; and 73% of medical malpractice cases.” Robert L. Rabin,
Law for Law’s Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2273 (1996) (emphasis added) (citing STEVEN K. SMITH
ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES IN
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posture accounts for more than half of all tort cases.143 Even when
individual defendants, such as doctors or drivers, are sued, insurance is
typically involved, and thus the real party in interest is a corporate
defendant.144 Although these facets of tort law are well known, it is
surprising that economic theories have not modeled the tort system as it
really is.145
Corporations treat tort liability like any other business decision.146 One
way to increase profit is to minimize the cost of liability and precaution.
The positive economic theory of tort law, as embodied in the Hand
Formula,147 is an invocation of this capitalist ethos. The mundane details
of asset–liability management influence corporate decisions. Given the
heterogeneity of parties in the prototypical tort action, a cost–benefit
analysis should not take a “one-size-fits-all” approach toward the
economics of valuation, incentives, and disincentives. Risk preference,
case risk, and opportunity cost are assessed in the context of
predispositions, perceptions, and circumstances.
With the cost of resolution defined in the previous Part, this Part builds
a simple pro forma model that illustrates the interplay between tort law
and bargaining with numeric inputs and outputs. But first a rather large
caveat is in order. A numeric illustration requires estimations of the factors
of the cost of resolution, and this Article provides some educated guesses.
The model is not predictive. Some inputs—the cost of risk aversion and a
firm’s cost of capital—can be reasonably reduced to quantifiable numbers.
Others are subject to the awkward process of quantifying the qualitative.
For example, we do not yet have a generally accepted way to calculate the
plaintiff’s opportunity cost outside of the time value of money. Perhaps
some proxy may serve as an estimate, such as the cost of borrowing under
distressed circumstances, or if we believe that agency is substantial, the
attorney’s cost of capital could be a rough substitute. Also, economic
LARGE COUNTIES 4 (1995)) (book review).
143. Galanter, supra note 103, at 1377 & n.25; see Gross & Syverud, supra note 104, at 19
(showing that about 61% of cases involve large businesses and government); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual
and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275,
1298 (2005) (showing that about 60% of cases involve individual plaintiffs versus organizational
defendants); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The
Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of
Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897) (“[T]he torts with which our courts are
kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of certain well known businesses.”).
144. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 104, at 21 (noting that about 96% of individual
defendants in tort have complete or partial insurance coverage).
145. See generally Siliciano, supra note 10 (arguing that the economic theory of tort law does
not consider the realities of corporate behavior).
146. See Heaton, supra note 126, at 272–73.
147. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
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analysis may shed light on the risk differential between a single case
outcome and a portfolio. These unresolved concepts, if quantifiable at all,
would contribute greatly to a predictive model, but the inquiries are
beyond the scope here.148 Rather, the following is an inferential exercise,
providing an impressionistic reflection, however simple (or simplistic), of
the general system of dispute resolution in the tort system. The numbers
are proxies for conceptualization. In this spirit, this pro forma exercise is
done.
The method of calculation is straightforward. First, parties always
project the expected value of trial. The trial outcome is calculated per the
standard economic model—probability multiplied by expected liability net
of transaction cost.
Second, parties calculate an independent value. An independent
valuation is an important baseline and is calculated as the expected value,
net of transaction cost and cost of resolution. Independent valuations are
the defendant’s maximum value and the plaintiff’s minimum value as
adjusted solely by their respective costs of resolution. It is, in the
professional vernacular, the “stomach turning settlement.” Absent
incompetence, parties do not settle at this unfavorable level because they
should take away some surplus from the bargaining table.
Finally, most settlements are reached after the give and take of
competent bargaining. The value of a thing does not exist in the state of
nature, so to speak. Parties seek information on the other’s conception of
value. At its core, an exercise in valuation is one of comparison; value is
relative to some other thing. With a common expected value, the contract
zone is the sum of the transaction cost and net cost of resolution. After
some litigation, which facilitates information acquisition and transparency,
most parties are assumed to discover the equitable value. Thus, settlement
is reached when the parties net their respective costs of resolution.
A few other details are noteworthy. A small percentage of cases are
tried, and a far larger portion are eventually settled after some litigation.
Litigation facilitates the information acquisition that is crucial for proper
valuation.149 The transaction cost of settlement through litigation is
assumed to be less than that of trial. Also, consistent with the above
examples, expected value is kept as a constant, though ex ante the parties
do not have the benefit of this knowledge.
148. That said, it is debatable whether a detailed model can be constructed given that we have
little empirical data on settlements. See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 5, at 18; Rhee, Effect of
Risk, supra note 8, at 214 n.95.
149. Information transparency is the most important factor in dispute resolution. See Kenneth
J. Arrow, Information Acquisition and the Resolution of Conflict, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 258, 259–72 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (acknowledging that uncertainties
can be resolved by acquisition of information and noting that there are acquisition costs when many
individuals are involved).
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Based on this method of calculation, we calculate the aggregate
payouts and receipts of the tort system. The following assumptions are
made on the trial and settlement split, the cost of resolution, and the
transaction cost.
1. Trial and Settlement Split
The assumption is that of all cases, 72% are settled, 8% are tried, and
20% are disposed of through pretrial dismissals.150 For simplicity,
procedural dismissals are not considered.151 As a percentage of the total
cases excluding dismissals, the trial and settlement rates are 10% and 90%,
respectively.
2. Transaction Costs
The transaction cost for trial is assumed to be 40% of the plaintiff’s
gross recovery.152 One can argue that the plaintiff’s transaction cost should
be higher than the defendant’s. Because contingent fees are riskier than
hourly fees, they should incorporate a risk premium.153 For simplicity, the
costs are assumed to be the same to facilitate a like-kind comparison.
Since settlement is resolved through litigation, it incurs substantial costs.

150. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
151. These cases invariably favor the defendant and suggest that the underlying merits were
questionable.
152. Empirical data support this figure. According to a Rand Corporation study, a dollar
expended in an average auto accident litigation in 1985 was distributed as follows: $0.52 for net
compensation to plaintiff, $0.24 for plaintiff attorney fees and costs, $0.13 for defense attorney fees
and costs, and $0.13 for other costs. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND, THE INST .
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 74 fig.7.2 (1986). With
equal sharing of other costs, the plaintiff’s gross recovery was about $0.82, and the defendant’s cost
was $0.20. The plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs as a percentage of the recovery was 37%, and the
defendant’s fees and costs as a percentage of the gross payout was 24%. In non-auto tort litigation,
a dollar was distributed as follows: $0.43 for compensation to plaintiff, $0.20 for plaintiff’s attorney
fees and costs, $0.18 for defendant’s attorney fees and costs, and $0.20 for other costs. Id. The
transaction costs for plaintiff and defendant were 41% and 38%, respectively. Blending these
figures, we calculate that the plaintiff’s and defendant’s attorney fees and costs are 39% and 31%,
respectively, of the total award. See also Franklin et al., supra note 13, at 33 (stating that plaintiff’s
attorney fees average 36% of recovery); Hylton, supra note 2, at 114 (stating that cost of litigation
is about 30% of damage award).
153. A contingent fee presumably incorporates a risk premium charged by the attorney,
whereas an hourly fee is subject only to the client’s credit risk. Thus, if the market for attorney
labor works in a competitive fashion, we expect the plaintiff’s attorney to earn more per case than
the defense attorney. See Molot, supra note 2, at 69 n.36 (noting that when plaintiff attorneys work
on hourly rates, the fee typically exceeds 20% of recovery, lower than the typical 33% recovery on
contingent fee arrangements); supra note 152 (suggesting that the attorney fees for plaintiffs and
defendants are on average 39% and 31%, respectively, of the total award).
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The transaction cost of settlement is assumed to be 30%.154
3. Defendant’s Cost of Resolution
A corporate defendant is considered to be risk neutral, and thus the cost
of risk aversion is zero. The corporation is assumed to have a diversified
basket of similarly situated legal liabilities, and no single case can put the
firm in financial distress.155 In any given case, the corporation’s perception
of the pooled risk will be lower than the plaintiff’s perception of the risk
of the specific case. Thus the cost of risk differential is zero. Note that the
costs of risk aversion and risk differential are relative measures. Because
these costs are lower than the plaintiff’s, they set the baseline at zero.
Legal liability is funded by the firm’s capital, which is readily calculable
for public companies. The size of the aggregate liability is correlated with
the firm’s business prospects.156 To generalize, the cost of variance is
assumed to be 10%, which is slightly less than the average return on equity
for public companies.157 Thus, the total cost of resolution is the cost of
capital that finances the enterprise’s activity.
4. Plaintiff’s Cost of Resolution
The plaintiff’s cost of resolution is assumed to be 40%, calculated as
the sum of 15% cost of risk aversion, 20% cost of variance, and 5% cost
of risk differential. The cost of risk aversion can be gleaned from
insurance profitability data. Premiums cover actuarial loss plus expense of
operation plus profit.158 The cost in excess of expected actuarial loss,
154. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 536 n.155 (noting that contingent fees are typically in the
range of 20%–30%); id. at 541 (noting that fees calculated under the “lodestar” method in securities
litigation are typically in the range of 25%–30%).
155. The analysis would be different if the unique risk of a case were so great that it would
increase the firm’s overall cost of capital because of the potential for financial distress. See David
M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress:
Evidence from the Texaco–Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157, 169–70 (1988).
156. Aswath Damodaran has commented to me that the discount rate applicable to value an
expected tort liability would depend on whether the liability correlates to the risk of the firm and
the economy. If one argues that the determinations of liability and amount are not correlated with
the economy or the firm’s operations, the discount rate would be the riskless rate. On the other
hand, if the tort liability is correlated with the firm’s earnings or value, a case can be made that the
discount rate should be the cost of capital. Because torts are a product of a firm’s activity, we can
reasonably assume that the greater the activity, the greater would be the amount of liability. Thus,
there would be a correlation between the level of liability and the firm’s earnings. Discussion with
Aswath Damodaran, Professor of Fin., Stern Sch. of Bus., N.Y. Univ. (Spring 2007).
157. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 82, at 149 (noting that from 1900 to 2003, the stock
market returned on average 11.7%). A weighted average cost of capital would be lower than this
because debt is cheaper than equity. Thus, an estimate of 10% is not unreasonable.
158. Premium is determined by the following formula: P = E(S) + k + R, where E(S) is the
expected value of the claim, k is the operating expenses, and R is a “risk premium which allows for
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including the opportunity cost of unearned premium, is the price of risk
transfer and is a reasonable proxy for the cost of risk aversion.
Based on this reasoning, we imply the cost of catastrophic risk aversion
as 30% of the actuarial risk.159 In the tort context, if a plaintiff’s injury is
severe, the degree of risk aversion would be similar to that implied by the
cost of insurance. The plaintiff’s cost of risk aversion is assumed to be
approximately half the cost of insurance. Many tort actions may not
involve catastrophic loss. As the stakes decrease, the tendency for risk
aversion decreases. Moreover, a plaintiff’s risk aversion will be tempered
by the influence of her attorney, who holds a portfolio of cases and thus is
less risk averse than her client.160
The cost of variance figure is an arbitrary, reasonable plug. It is
arbitrary because there is no empirical support for a figure of twice the
corporation’s cost of capital. Unlike a firm’s cost of capital, an
individual’s cost of variance is a concept without a method of
quantification. A qualitative comparison must be the basis of derivation.
There is no question that this is inelegant, but it reflects the untidy world
in which not all things are reducible to a clean equation. A qualitative
assessment suggests that the cost of variance is always more expensive
than that of a corporation. That said, the assumption is reasonable because
the cost is greater than that of a corporation. As discussed before, the
opportunity cost of the stake is at minimum the market return.
Accordingly, on average a firm’s cost of capital approximates the
plaintiff’s minimum opportunity cost. Also, as discussed, the factors that
determine a firm’s cost of capital in the markets—riskiness of the return,
access to future capital, possibility of financial distress, etc.—have

coverage of unforeseen deviations in the claims amount to be paid.” See BRIYS & DE VARENNE,
supra note 123, at 6. This formula has not changed since the days of Adam Smith and the inception
of Lloyd’s of London. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 125 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994) (1776) (“[C]ommon premium must
be sufficient to compensate the common losses, to pay the expence of management, and to afford
such a profit as might have been drawn from an equal capital employed in any common trade.”).
159. Rhee, Price Theory, supra note 7, at 685; see A.M. BEST CO., AGGREGATES &
AVERAGES—PROPERTY/CASUALTY 88, 90 (2005) (finding that from 2000 to 2004, the average
incurred loss and operating expense for property and casualty insurers have been 79.2% and 25.6%
of premiums, and the average return on invested assets has been 5.2%); see also HARRINGTON &
NIEHAUS, supra note 89, at 170 (finding that the typical loading charge is 10% to 50% of premium).
160. Rhee, Effect of Risk, supra note 8, at 253; see Saks, supra note 5, at 1191 (“An attorney’s
cases may be thought of as a portfolio of investments.”). Attorneys, despite their fees, typically add
value to the plaintiff’s recovery. Franklin et al., supra note 13, at 33 (“There is strong evidence,
however, that despite this cost, plaintiffs do better with a lawyer than they would have done had
they handled the cases themselves.”); see FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 5, at 50; ROSS, supra
note 13, at 116, 193; Rhee, Effect of Risk, supra note 8, at 253–56. See generally Ronald J. Gilson,
Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984)
(concluding that business lawyers, as transaction cost engineers, have the potential to create value).
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relevance to the individual as well. A plaintiff’s lost or impaired capital
may be difficult to replace.161 Most ordinary tort cases do not pose
significant risk of financial distress for a corporate defendant because the
amount of the dispute is typically small in comparison to the firm’s capital.
For a plaintiff, on the other hand, the impact of a negative outcome of any
given case is typically much greater because of the wealth difference.162
Although the selected numeric rate is arbitrary, the conceptual assumption
is reasonable.163
As for the cost of risk differential, even if the parties view the facts and
laws similarly, they perceive a different quantum of risk because the risk
of a single case is always greater than the risk of a portfolio of similarly
situated cases. The opinion in Rhone-Poulenc makes this clear.164 One
variable is obviously the extent to which the defendant’s pool of lawsuits
is large and diversified. For the purposes of modeling, the cost of risk
differential is assumed to be a modest 5%.

161. For example, the rate for uncollateralized credit, such as credit cards, is typically in the
mid-teens, higher than the cost of capital of corporations. Add to this a cost of financial distress,
and we can easily see that the cost of capital for an injured individual can be high.
162. We see evidence of this in insurance pricing behavior. See generally HARRINGTON &
NIEHAUS, supra note 89, at 149 (describing a circumstance where premiums “increase by more than
the discounted value of expected claim costs”); Rhee, Terrorism Risk, supra note 73 (describing
the effect of reduced capital on premium pricing in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
163. Even in the field of finance, whose theories can be judged against vast amounts of
empirical data, there are concepts that simply elude empirical confirmation. In analyzing the degree
that the price of a stock may deviate from its intrinsic value, Fischer Black speculated that stocks
may vary by a factor of two. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986). He suggested that
this factor of two is “arbitrary” but intuitively “reasonable” in light of the impossibility of empirical
testing. Id.
164. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
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5. Summary of Relative Costs of Resolution
Figure 4 illustrates the systematic difference between parties in the
prototypical tort case.

The selection horizon H serves as a useful reference. If the defendant’s
selection horizon has the same degree of risk preference as the plaintiff’s,
then it would be H (both parties have the same cost of risk aversion
because the x-intercept of the selection horizons would be the same). But
a corporate defendant is less risk averse than a plaintiff, and thus the actual
selection horizon is HD. The difference between the risk preferences,
measured as Cp, represents the plaintiff’s 15% cost of risk aversion. The
reference H has the same slope as HD, which is steeper than HP. The
defendant’s cost of variance (capital) is 10%, whereas the plaintiff’s cost
of variance is 20%. The difference measured as Cv is 10%. The parties
differ on the perception of risk, resulting in different case assessments: SP
= [Pi, Fi] and SD = [Pi, Fj], where Fi > Fj. The risk differential Cr is
assumed to be a modest 5%.
B. Pro Forma Model Outputs
Based on the assumptions and above methodology for calculation,
Table 3 shows the outputs.
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Table 3
% Expected Discount Liability Trans.
Class Value
Rate
Cost Rate
Trial
Defendant 10%
Plaintiff
10%
Independent Settlement
Defendant 90%
Plaintiff
90%

Trans.
Cost

Total
Payment

100
100

0%
0%

100
100

40%
40%

40
40

140
60

100
100

10%
40%

110
60

30%
30%

33
18

143
42

Defendant 90%
100
Plaintiff
90%
100
Weighted Avg. Outcomes

15%
15%

85
85

30%
30%

26
26

111
60

Equitable Settlement

Defendant

100%

100

14%

87

31%

27

113

Plaintiff

100%

100

14%

87

31%

27

60

As suggested above, there are four valuational constructs at work in the
resolution of a tort dispute: trial valuation, independent settlement
valuation, equitable settlement, and weighted average of outcomes. These
valuations are considered separately.
1. Trial Valuation
Under the conventional view, if the parties agree on the expected value
of a case and there is no strategic behavior, the contract zone is determined
by the aggregate transaction cost. This is the precise result in Table 3. It
indicates that the defendant’s payout and the plaintiff’s net receipt are 140
and 60, respectively. The contract zone is 80, representing the combined
transaction cost.
2. Independent Settlement Valuations
The defendant’s independent valuation is its assessment of the tort
liability, net of transaction cost and cost of resolution. With a cost of
resolution of 10% and transaction cost of 30%, the maximum settlement
value is 143. This suggests that, consistent with an empirical study of
settlement practices of insurance companies,165 the defendant is near the
indifference point between trial and settlement. For the plaintiff, the
circumstance is different. The cost of resolution is 40%. Net of transaction
cost and cost of resolution, the plaintiff’s minimum settlement value is 42.
Trial is a far superior option to the independent settlement value.

165. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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3. Equitable Settlement
The net cost of resolution is 30%, suggesting an equitable discount of
15% and a settlement value of 85. Once again, this level of discount has
empirical support, and, on an intuitive and anecdotal level, the proposition
that individual plaintiffs systematically give a discount to corporate
defendants is reasonable.166 With transaction cost, the defendant’s total
payout is 111, and the plaintiff’s net receipt is 60. Relative to trial,
settlement represents a far superior outcome to the defendant while the
plaintiff is near the indifference point.
4. Weighted Average of Outcomes
Considering that settlements constitute the vast majority of resolutions,
we calculate the weighted average costs and payments of all outcomes to
get an overview of the entire system. (Obviously, with a litigation system
heavily skewed toward settlement, the average closely resembles the
settlement figures.) The average discount is 14%, and transaction cost is
31% of recovery. The defendant’s total payout is 113, representing 87 in
liability and 27 in transaction cost. (Discrepancy in addition is due to
rounding.) Net of transaction cost, the plaintiff’s compensation is 60.
Although these outputs are not meant to be predictive, they are roughly
consistent with empirical studies. On average, settlements produce better
or no worse outcomes than trials.167 This is particularly so for defendants,
who have a greater disparity in the values achieved between trial and
166. There is substantial empirical and anecdotal evidence of a systematic discount. See ROSS,
supra note 13, at 215 (quoting an attorney who recommends “a settlement of 75 to 80 percent of
the probable recovery should be accepted”); Patricia Danzon, The Medical Malpractice System:
Facts and Reforms, in THE EFFECTS OF LITIGATION ON HEALTH CARE COSTS 28, 30 (Mary Ann
Baily & Warren I. Cikins eds., 1985) (noting that average claims settled for approximately 74% of
the potential verdict); see also BAKER, supra note 15, at 110–11 (stating that settlements in medical
malpractice actions undercompensate victims); FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 5, at 28–51
(presenting historical empirical evidence that workers typically recovered little for workplace
accidents); FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 363 (stating that most worker claims at the turn of the
twentieth century “received little or no compensation”); Deborah R. Hensler, The Real World of
Tort Litigation, in 2 EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 155, 155 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.,
1998) (“The real world of tort litigation, as revealed by quantitative empirical analyses of tort
litigation over the past several decades, by qualitative case studies of tort suits, and by
autobiographical narratives by tort plaintiffs, falls far short of these aspirations.”). Recently,
economic models based on finance theory predicted the inevitability of these discounts. See Rhee,
Price Theory, supra note 7, at 674–84; Rhee, Effect of Risk, supra note 8, at 201–04, 235–39.
167. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 104, at 7 (noting that plaintiffs “do less well at trial than
they would have by settling”). This does not suggest that settlements are normatively superior. See
Rhee, Price Theory, supra note 7, at 625. Even if the average recovery in settlement is higher, trial
should not be construed as irrational. An average value, such as aggregate jury verdict data, will
have relevance that is subservient to the facts and laws applicable to any given case.
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settlement. The difference in value constitutes potential surplus. The
defendant can manage the dispute resolution process and avoid trial (a
most expensive endeavor) by offering an amount from this surplus that is
sufficient to incentivize the plaintiff to settle. This explains in large part
why settlements are so prominent in tort actions. The tort system is not the
“all-or-nothing proposition that its rules envision and its critics decry,” but
it instead provides “part-recovery-most-of-the-time.”168 Deductions from
compensation are a structural feature of the tort system.169 The most
obvious factor is the American rule of attorney fees. But a less obvious
structural feature—the subject of this Article—is the risk-adjusted
discount in settlement value. The going assumption has been that
settlements in the aggregate reflect the probabilistic outcome. This is
wrong.
Another way to analyze these outputs is to consider the plaintiff’s net
compensation to transaction cost, and to compare the results to the cost
structure of insurance. Table 4 shows the breakdown.
Table 4
Net
Percent of Trans. Cost /
Payments Receipt & Cost Net Receipt
Trial
Plaintiff’s Net Receipt
Total Transaction Cost
Equitable Settlement

60
80

43%
57%

1.33x

Plaintiff’s Net Receipt
Total Transaction Cost
W t. Avg. Outcomes
Plaintiff’s Net Receipt
Total Transaction Cost
Insurance
Insured’s Net Receipt
Total Cost

60
51

54%
46%

0.86x

60
54

52%
48%

0.91x

79
23

77%
23%

0.30x

These outputs are also consistent with the empirical understanding of
the tort system. For trials, it takes $1.33 in transaction cost to deliver one
dollar of net compensation.170 For the litigation-facilitated system of
168. Franklin et al., supra note 13, at 35.
169. See Hylton, supra note 2, at 113–14 (arguing that litigation cost deductions result in
partial compensation).
170. See supra note 152; see also John J. Donahue III, The Law and Economics of Tort Law:
The Profound Revolution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1989) (noting that the overhead cost of
the tort system is $16 to $19 billion while delivering $15 billion in net compensation); Rabin, supra
note 142, at 2280 (noting that in 1985 costs ranged from 43% to 52% of the plaintiff’s total

2008]

TO RT ARBITRAG E

165

dispute resolution as a whole, the cost ratio is reduced to approximately
0.91x. This still compares unfavorably to the cost ratio of insurance of
0.30x.171 The litigation system is very expensive compared to insurance,
at least when the definition of cost is limited to transaction cost.
C. Cost Accounting
The pro forma model provides a simple, impressionistic picture of the
tort system. On first glance, the results are not particularly interesting.
Nothing is remarkable about the propositions that the tort system is costly
and that it provides only partial compensation. This is yesterday’s news.
Although the broad conclusions of the model are uncontroversial, the
“internals” provide new and important insights. The model shows that the
tort system expends $0.91 for every dollar of compensation, three times
the cost structure of insurance. An important distinction, however, between
the tort system and an insurance scheme is the allocation of cost. In an
insurance scheme, the policyholder bears the primary accident cost as well
as the administrative cost, subject to pass through. In a litigation system,
the tortfeasor bears the loss upon a finding of liability, but the costs
associated with resolving the dispute are perceived to be shared under the
American rule of attorney fees. This perception is misleading, or at least
incomplete. The nature of this cost-sharing aspect deserves a closer look.
Transaction cost and cost of resolution have thus far been
distinguished. The total cost reflects their sum. Table 5 provides this
debit–credit accounting for equitable settlements and weighted average of
all outcomes.

recovery, and that defendant’s costs average 28% to slightly over 50% of payment (citing KAKALIK
& PACE, supra note 152, at 68)); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir.
1985) (Breyer, J.) (“Indeed, the legal time, the legal resources, the delay appurtenant to the tort
action apparently mean that on average the victim recovers only between 28 and 44 cents of every
dollar paid by actual or potential defendants, while victims who insure themselves directly recover
at least between 55 and 66 cents of each premium dollar earned by insurance companies and
between 85 and 90 cents of every dollar actually paid out to investigate and satisfy claims.”).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 159–60.
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Table 5
Payment & Transaction Cost of Total
Receipt
Cost
Resolution Cost
Equitable Settlement
Defendant
111
26
(15)
11
Plaintiff
85
26
15
41
____
____
____
Total
51
0
51
Wt. Avg. Outcomes

Percent Split
(Trans. Cost)

Percent Split
(Total Cost)

50%
50%
____
100%

21%
79%
____
100%

Defendant

113

27

(14)

13

50%

25%

Plaintiff

87

27
____
54

14
____
0

40
____
54

50%
____
100%

75%
____
100%

Total

The assignment of cost is striking. The percent split of transaction cost
is assumed to be equal. When total cost is considered, however, the cost
split is lopsided in favor of defendants: 21% to 79% for settlements, and
25% to 75% for the weighted average of all outcomes. Figure 5 illustrates
this difference.

Another perspective on this cost allocation is gained by looking at the
defendant’s total cost ratio. As a percentage of the payout calculated under
the legal (judicial) standard, the defendant’s cost ratio is only 13%
(13/100),172 a superior cost ratio to that of insurance. Thus, as compared to
insurance, negligence provides superior returns to the defendants because
the plaintiffs subsidize some of the cost.
172. See supra Table 5 (discrepancies in addition are due to rounding).
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Transaction cost underestimates the true cost associated with resolving
a dispute. The cost of resolution is commonly ignored in modeling
because, one suspects, it is difficult to measure empirically and to
conceptualize on the foundation of the rational person. After all, the
rational person is risk neutral and has infinite capital. While this is the
standard reference point, it is inaccurate. Settlement cannot be a cost-free
endeavor; it is a risky transaction because a party must evaluate the price
of uncertainty and thus can err in valuation. The risk is not recognized as
a cash expense. Settlement can be a process where one cost is simply
swapped for another without apparent advantage, but, managed properly,
settlement can achieve better pricing of the assets and liabilities. “Thus
viewed, transaction cost economics is an incomplete answer to the
question of settlement.”173 The cost of resolution is an economic cost that
is “imbedded in the valuation of the dispute through a discount to value,”
and “it may not be readily apparent but is equally consequential.”174 When
the total costs are debited and credited to the parties’ cost accounts, an
entirely different picture of cost allocation emerges.
There is another important distinction between transaction cost and the
cost of resolution. The allocation of transaction cost between the parties
is not zero sum. They can manage a transaction efficiently so that
payments to third-party attorneys are minimized. But a risk-adjusted
discount stemming from the net cost of resolution is a valuational
adjustment between the parties. Like the assignment of liability, its
allocation is always zero sum. Unless the net cost of resolution is zero (a
highly unlikely situation) plaintiffs always give a discount at settlement,
and this discount substantially funds the defendant’s transaction cost.
Because the discount is zero sum, the tort system as administered
through settlement is still consistent with the Kaldor–Hicks criterion: “A
change is wealth maximizing if the dollar value of the gains to the winners
is greater than the dollar cost of the losses to the losers.”175 The cost of
resolution has no effect on overall wealth; its effect is simply distributive.
Therefore, if the cost of precaution is a single function of the market price
of labor and materials,176 there must be different standards of care. Figure
6 shows this effect.

173.
174.
175.
176.

Rhee, Effect of Risk, supra note 8, at 228.
Id. at 199.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 16.
See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text.
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Courts determine the cost of accident PL. With a burden of precaution
B fixed by market prices, the judicial standard of care is set at x.
Settlement, however, devalues the cost of accident to PL*. This
devaluation reduces the standard of care from x to x*. Tort law is not
efficient, as efficiency has been defined by the economic model, because
courts are largely irrelevant in the instrumental function of determining
value.177 Parties settle only when each party determines that settlement is
better than the application of the legal standard at trial. From the
standpoint of determining the law, a comparison of interpersonal utilities
may indeed be “arbitrary,”178 but from the perspective of private
resolution, the parties necessarily engage in such comparisons to achieve
the best result.179 Thus, courts may fix the standard of care as a matter of
aspiration, allowing the disputants to bargain “in the shadow of the law,”
but in practice the standard of care is a variable that floats freely in the tort
177. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 387, 423 (1994) (noting that tort law provides a meaningful
but imperfect deterrence). Schwartz concluded that one who seeks an explanation of the empirical
world “would be largely warranted in ignoring” the standard law-and-economics analysis. Id. at
426; cf. Alexander, supra note 2, at 505 (concluding that the merits of a case are irrelevant in the
settlement of securities actions). Indeed, courts are happy to be marginalized players given their
normative preference for settlement.
178. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 54–58; see also KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 9 (2d ed. 1963). But see Richard A. Epstein, Rights and “Rights
Talk,” 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106, 1118 (1992) (“Only some professional economists talk as if there
is an impenetrable barrier preventing interpersonal comparisons of utility. Most of us are quite
happy to make such comparisons, and do so with confidence, every day of our lives.”).
179. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 202 (1973)
(“In economic terms, the resolution of every dispute requires a trade-off between the parties, for
no one has yet found a way in which both parties could win a lawsuit.”).
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marketplace.180
Tort law in the shadow of the civil litigation system presents an
arbitrage opportunity for the tort defendant. Arbitrage exists when an
imperfection in the market creates a riskless profit opportunity.181 A classic
example occurs when the same assets are priced differently in different
forums. A similar situation exists in the tort system because the public and
private forums offer different prices for the cost of accident. The
“imperfection” in the tort system is the reality that plaintiffs and
defendants are not similarly situated. Heterogeneity in parties and
circumstances results in different costs of resolution and therefore different
valuations. The defendant’s lower cost of resolution—in essence a lower
cost of transacting to fund the accident—allows the defendant to exploit
this price disparity, thus externalizing transaction cost to plaintiffs.182
180. The conclusion that uncertainty leads to a reduction in the standard of care apparently
differs in some respect from the conclusion reached by other scholars. Notably, Richard Craswell
and John Calfee argued that uncertainty can lead to overcompliance. See Richard Craswell & John
E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986)
[hereinafter Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards]; see also John E.
Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70
VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984). Their basic argument is that if uncertainty is distributed normally
around the optimal standard of care, and if the uncertainty is not too great, the legal rule will have
an overdeterrence effect. Craswell & Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, supra,
at 299; see Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89
IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004) (arguing that uncertainty of sanction may lead to greater deterrence). The
intuition is that because the legal application of the rule is uncertain, it may be cost beneficial to
incur the additional cost of taking more precaution if the cost is outweighed by the potential for
liability due to error. The degree of overdeterrence depends on the range of error. As long as the
range of error is small, overdeterrence may result even for risk-neutral parties. The difference in
conclusions is more apparent than real. Assuming that a defendant would confront an uncertain
application of an optimal standard of care, a cost–benefit analysis may lead to overprecaution.
However, the argument in this Article is that the settlements are struck at valuations below the
optimal standard of care defined by the legal rule. The question here is the effect of uncertainty on
the location of the standard of care, and not its effect on incentives in the vicinity of the standard
of care once it is ascertained. To the extent that private parties set the standard of care, uncertainty
of enforcement may lead to overdeterrence from this baseline, which is consistent with Craswell
and Calfee’s argument.
181. See FOCARDI & FABOZZI, supra note 84, at 393.
182. To be clear, the argument here is not that this inequity is illegitimate. Without too much
of a foray into a normative argument, I suggest that this inequity is legitimate in the limited sense
that it is not gotten illicitly or unethically, nor presumably applied in an unconscionable manner,
but it stems instead from circumstantial differences. Ordinarily, the reflexive instinct is to delve into
the policy considerations of this inequity. But because this Article advances a positive theory, a
normative analysis is not within its scope, in part because I do not yet know what the normative
response, if any, should be. An analysis must address whether one participant’s value assignment
should be seen as “better” or “more accurate.” If so, by what criteria? One presumes that parties
who settle believe that they maximized their utility because settlement is by definition bilateral. The
question raises an issue of whether, in the context of dispute resolution, a comparison of
interpersonal utilities can be a measure of efficiency, for, as Richard Epstein observed, one has yet
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The above exercise shows that, while the litigation system is costly, the
assignment of cost is substantially disproportionate in spite of mutual cost
bearing under the American rule. In short, the tort system is expensive and
seems unfair. This leads to the question posed by Edward White: What
accounts for the “unexpected persistence” of the fault standard in the face
of many challenges to its supremacy within the tort and compensation
systems?183 One answer, I believe, is suggested in the historical
development of negligence.
V. NEGLIGENCE IN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
As tort law has continued to evolve through history, speculation on the
demise of negligence has been frequent.184 In the twentieth century, a
number of doctrines and theories emerged to challenge the primacy of
negligence, including legislation, strict liability, product liability,
enterprise liability, and no-fault insurance schemes. These doctrines and
theories, broadly termed “enterprise liability,” sought to assign the costs
of accidents to the activity that created them.185 Mirroring the dynamic
nature of tort law, scholarship advanced numerous theories and analytic
methods to give tort law an intellectual structure. These theories asked,
among other things, whether tort law creates the appropriate incentives to
reduce the costs of accidents, whether it efficiently allocates the costs
between parties, whether it provides appropriate compensation to victims,
and whether it promotes corrective justice. The changes in doctrine and
competition of ideas have created dynamic uncertainty in the development
of tort law.186 Considering this environment, Edward White speculated, in
to find a way in which both parties can win a verdict at trial. See Epstein, supra note 179, at 202;
see also supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text. The normative implications, if any, are better
left for another day.
183. See G. Edward White, The Unexpected Persistence of Negligence, 1980–2000, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2001).
184. In 1967, the Virginia Law Review held a symposium on precisely this question, which
was considered by prominent tort scholars of the day. A Symposium in Honor of Charles O.
Gregory, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967). The thoughts then were as diverse as they are now. Fleming
James opined that negligence may continue, but the standard of care may be watered down to where
it is “negligence without fault.” Fleming James, Jr., The Future of Negligence in Accident Law, 53
VA. L. REV. 911, 917 (1967). John Fleming argued that tort law may “shrink to ever more modest
proportions” with the advent of risk-distribution measures such as social security and insurance.
John G. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815, 815 (1967).
Robert Keeton observed that negligence will continue to have a role because tort law is an unending
process of political and economic accommodations of the time. Robert E. Keeton, Is There a Place
for Negligence in Modern Tort Law?, 53 VA. L. REV. 886, 897–98 (1967).
185. WHITE, supra note 3, at 245.
186. In the current state of tort theory, there are two predominant theories, the economic and
moral theories of tort law. These theories have spun off into variations of multiple flavors. See
generally Goldberg, supra note 3 (describing the variations in theory).
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Tort Law in America, what a hypothetical group of tort scholars in the
1970s might have predicted in the future development of tort doctrine and
scholarship.187 He concluded that trends in doctrine and scholarship
“would have led most predictors to anticipate that the forthcoming decades
would witness the growing prominence of enterprise-based theories of tort
liability.”188 Yet tort law subsequently experienced a retrenchment of the
fault standard.189 Since Brown v. Kendall190 was announced in 1850,
negligence has remained the dominant theory of accident law. Despite the
academic interest in competing theories, such as strict liability,191 it is
noteworthy that negligence is the primary standard of care in all
jurisdictions.192 There are probably many reasons—historical, cultural,
political, economic, and philosophical—for the negligence standard’s
monolithic vitality. This Article focuses on one aspect of the economic
explanation—the influence of negligence on value and its connection to
the overall philosophy of the American civil litigation system.
As seen, the central problem in the dispute resolution process, within
and without the judicial system, is the management of uncertainty.193 In
this context, the standard of care is not value neutral. The fault standard
creates a significant degree of uncertainty. Despite the efforts of many
generations of judges and scholars to define the crucial element of
negligence, the standard of care is difficult to fix or predict. In The

187. WHITE, supra note 3, at 244.
188. Id. at 245–46. This prediction is consistent with some of the thoughts expressed in the
1967 Virginia Law Review symposium. See supra note 184.
189. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 246–48.
190. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). There, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw opined that a plaintiff
suing in trespass must “show either that the intention was lawful, or that the defendant was in
fault.” Id. at 295–96. Although Brown was not the first American case that applied the fault
standard, its “significance lay in Shaw’s recognition of the capacity of ‘fault’ to serve as a
comprehensive standard.” WHITE, supra note 3, at 15.
191. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 179. Scholars have argued that the deterrence effect
between negligence and strict liability is theoretically the same under certain conditions. POLINSKY,
supra note 68, at 46.
192. The most significant deviation is workers’ compensation. The view that workers’
compensation was a social triumph over industry during the Progressive Era is inaccurate. See
FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 5, at 12, 198. Workers’ compensation schemes and their rapid
adoption throughout the states occurred because the economic interests of the major interest groups
converged. Id. at 17–18, 198–99. The key that unlocked the benefit for all three interest
groups—workers, employers, and insurers—was the reduction of “the uncertainty surrounding
their accident costs.” Id. at 13–14. Insurers could underwrite lower premium levels as a result of
larger participation and mitigation of adverse selection. Id. at 55. Workers benefited from lower
insurance levels and increased certainty of payouts upon an accident, even if this meant less wages.
Id. at 23. Employers gained from the predictability of liability even if this meant greater liability
payouts and administrative costs. Id. at 11–13. Thus, the principles of financial economics explain
the movement toward universal workers’ compensation.
193. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
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Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that the negligence
standard is a “vague test.”194 Like most people, Holmes valued
predictability and order and disliked uncertainty. The “coarseness” of the
standard, he said, must be redressed: “[T]he tendency of the law must
always be to narrow the field of uncertainty.”195 The law of negligence
could, after years of experience, be subject to the precision of a
“mathematical line.”196 Thus, the determination of negligence could
eventually become a question of law.197
The error in Holmes’s vision is not the misguided view that negligence
is capable of judicial codification; after all, the theory of negligence was
still a relatively new doctrine at the time Holmes wrote The Common Law.
Rather, he failed to see that uncertainty is the vital element of negligence.
Certainty of outcome, such as strict liability, can be brought about only by
government mandate. The governing condition of meritorious civil action
is the uncertainty of outcome.198 The fault standard enhances the
unpredictability of liability and damage determinations. Factfinding
always involves “a measure of speculation and conjecture.”199 In the case
of negligence, the standard is known and thus not arbitrary, but its
application is uncertain and thus unpredictable to a degree.200

194. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 88–89 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., The
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881); see Sisler v. Gannett Co., 516 A.2d 1083, 1094
(N.J. 1986) (finding that the negligence standard is characterized by “vagueness and unpredictable
jury applications”); FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 351 (noting that negligence employs “the vague,
subtle standard of the ‘reasonable man’”).
195. HOLMES, supra note 194, at 90, 101.
196. See id. at 99–103.
197. See id. at 99 (“A judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought gradually to acquire a fund
of experience which enables him to represent the common sense of the community in ordinary
instances far better than an average jury.”). The debate was had in conflicting opinions by Holmes
and Cardozo in railway cases. Compare Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70
(1927) (Holmes, J.) (finding that when dealing with a standard of conduct, it should be laid down
by the courts), with Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 106 (1934) (Cardozo, J.) (finding that
standard-of-care determinations should be left to the jury). Later experience showed that Holmes’s
instinct was misplaced, for negligence cannot be set forth in a series of predictable rules. See Mars
Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Justice
Holmes believed that courts would (at least, should) slowly reduce all of tort law to objective,
readily applied rules. This is not viewed today as one of his more astute predictions.” (citations
omitted)).
198. Hay & Spier, supra note 10, at 446 (“In nearly all cases, the outcome of trial is uncertain;
the uncertainty may be over whether the plaintiff will win, how much he will recover in the event
he wins, or both.”).
199. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946).
200. There is rich literature on the jurisprudential implications of rules versus standards. See
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1990); Russell
B. Korbkin, Behavior Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23
(2000); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
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It is well settled that, where there is uncertainty as to the
existence of either negligence or contributory negligence, the
question is not one of law, but of fact, and to be settled by a
jury; and this whether the uncertainty arises from a conflict in
the testimony, or because, the facts being undisputed, fairminded men will honestly draw different conclusions from
them.201
Uncertainty has a profound valuational consequence. Uncertainty either
diminishes or increases the value of a lawsuit, and the direction is a
function of the net cost of resolution between parties. In tort law, the
defendant enjoys this advantage. The systematic devaluation of tort claims
has several effects. It magnifies the importance of transaction cost savings
because this cost becomes more important in the calculus of dispute
resolution as the stake decreases. On a related point, devaluation
functionally increases the contract zone from which a settlement can be
struck. Thus, the negligence standard promotes private pricing of the costs
of accident.202
Negligence requires the least governmental intervention in the pricing
of the costs of accident. Its persistence today is attributable to a normative
preference by courts for private resolution. Again, we see evidence of this
preference in Holmes’s thoughts. He argued that tort law should be
administered without excessive state interference:
The state might conceivably make itself a mutual
insurance company against accidents, and distribute the
burden of its citizens’ mishaps among all its members. There
might be a pension for paralytics, and state aid for those who
suffered in person or estate from tempest or wild beasts. As
between individuals it might adopt the mutual insurance
principle pro tanto, and divide damages when both were in
fault, as in the rusticum judicium of the admiralty, or it might
throw all loss upon the actor irrespective of fault. The state
does none of these things, however, and the prevailing view
201. Richmond & Danville R.R. v. Powers, 149 U.S. 43, 45 (1893). The uncertainty of the
negligence standard is frequently recognized in defamation cases. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 389 (1967) (noting that the reasonable standard of care is “elusive”); Sisler v. Gannett Co., 516
A.2d 1083, 1093 (N.J. 1986) (“One problem inherent in the negligence standard is the great
uncertainty engendered in its application.”); Nist v. Tudor, 407 P.2d 798, 802 (Wash. 1965)
(“[C]ase law shows the same uncertainty in applying the gross negligence standard to given facts
and demonstrates that the profession at large has undertaken the impossible task of defining the
indefinable.”).
202. Settlement becomes more likely when trial costs are greater relative to the stake at issue.
See Hay & Spier, supra note 10, at 444. Thus, most small instances of injury do not result in a filed
action, much less a trial. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
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is that its cumbrous and expensive machinery ought not to be
set in motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived from
disturbing the status quo. State interference is an evil, where
it cannot be shown to be a good. Universal insurance, if
desired, can be better and more cheaply accomplished by
private enterprise. The undertaking to redistribute losses
simply on the ground that they resulted from the defendant’s
act would not only be open to these objections, but, as it is
hoped the preceding discussion has shown, to the still graver
one of offending the sense of justice. Unless my act is of a
nature to threaten others, unless under the circumstances a
prudent man would have foreseen the possibility of harm, it
is no more justifiable to make me indemnify my neighbor
against the consequences, than to make me do the same thing
if I had fallen upon him in a fit, or to compel me to insure
him against lightning.203
Holmes’s original analysis is confirmed by the historical developments
of academic theories and judicial doctrines in the latter half of the
twentieth century. Enterprise liability requires the government to assess
liability in broad strokes. As doctrines in support of enterprise liability
were gaining prominence from the 1940s to the 1970s,204 the theory of
negligence, surprisingly, retrenched in both doctrine and scholarship.
White noted this phenomenon:
Thus the underlying cause of the parallel developments in
academic theory and tort doctrine I have identified, and the
central reason why a negligence-based model of tort liability
has unexpectedly persisted since the 1980s, is the widespread
loss of faith in government-run distributive solutions to social
problems. Traditional negligence theory has continued to
flourish because it is far less distributive, and requires far less
participation from governmental units, than enterprise
liability alternatives.205

203. HOLMES, supra note 194, at 77–78.
204. This period gave rise to significant developments in enterprise and product liability. See,
e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (discussing enterprise liability and adopting
a market share theory of liability); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)
(imposing strict liability on a manufacturer); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)
(imposing strict liability for physical harm on sellers of unreasonably dangerous defective
products).
205. WHITE, supra note 3, at 289; see Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical
Revival in the Common Law, 28 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1, 29–39 (2004) (discussing the classical
revival of the negligence concept and the move of product liability from strict liability to a
negligence-based theory).
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The instinct against government risk-distribution schemes is rooted not
only in the historical ambivalence toward the institution of government in
the American political psyche but also in empirical experience: “one of the
most evident lessons from history is that political systems have an inherent
tendency to produce inefficient property rights which result in stagnation
or decline.”206 This country has a “political tradition that is mistrustful of
bureaucratic authority—preferring to fragment authority and to hold it
legally accountable through individually activated rights and adversarial
litigation.”207 Tort law is not above the tension created by the ebb and flow
of competing ideas on the role of government in the allocation of risk and
cost. It is not surprising that theories of enterprise liability found a
sympathetic ear during the middle of the twentieth century because this
was a period when the government’s ability to solve social problems was
viewed optimistically. In opposition to these tendencies, then, is the theory
of negligence. Under the fault standard, all factors of valuation are variable
and subject to a private contractual agreement on price.
With this in mind, we can broadly organize compensation
schemes—negligence, strict liability, and managed compensation—around
several themes: the level of litigation activity, the public or private nature
of pricing, and the degree of uncertainty in resolution. Obviously,
managed compensation, followed by strict liability, would require the
greatest government involvement. In terms of litigation activity, managed
compensation would generate none because litigation would be foregone
in favor of a no-fault insurance or pooled compensation, but it would
produce the greatest number of claims because the claimants would bear
little administrative cost in asserting a claim. Strict liability in comparison
to negligence would generate the larger volume of litigation.208 These
schemes can be arranged according to their essential characteristics. As a
way of providing a reference point, we also throw into the mix an
imaginary scheme that resolves tort disputes in an entirely unpredictable
manner. No party in a disputed action would subject themselves to a
seemingly arbitrary outcome, and they would settle instead.209 If these
206. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth, 25 ECON.
INQUIRY 419, 422 (1987). Government insurance programs are perhaps the largest and most explicit
risk-distribution schemes, and they have had mixed results. See Rhee, Catastrophic Risks and
Governance, supra note 73, at 599–600, 609–11 (discussing the failures of national flood
insurance); Rhee, Terrorism Risk, supra note 73, at 485–96 (discussing the problems with
government-sponsored insurance programs).
207. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 125 (2001).
208. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 65 (explaining that strict liability generates more
lawsuits); POLINSKY, supra note 68, at 54–55 (explaining why the negligence rule generates less
litigation than the strict-liability rule).
209. We assume that all lawsuits are meritorious. Otherwise, an arbitrary scheme would attract
frivolous suits. See Gould, supra note 1, at 296 (“If the courts acted arbitrarily and without
precedent, an enormous number of property right disputes would have to be resolved in court, and
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schemes are compared, one sees that negligence occupies a certain
“space.” Figure 7 illustrates this. In short, negligence is the legal standard
that is most consistent with the prevailing normative preference for private
ordering of disputes.210

In some abstract notion, one supposes that the elimination of lawsuits
is a good thing, though the thought that reduced litigation is good is an odd
one without context. Litigation can be dramatically reduced in relation to
negligence only with a managed compensation system or an arbitrary
system of wholly unpredictable outcomes. In between these extremes,
strict liability and negligence occupy their respective spaces. Negligence
requires the lowest level of government action, and managed
compensation requires the greatest level. Greater outcome uncertainty
facilitates private pricing.211 Negligence, then, is the compromise standard.
It balances the role of government with private choice; it promotes dispute
resolution at a lower level of litigation activity; and it is difficult to predict
in application without being arbitrary. In short, negligence is the legal
standard that is most consistent with the normative preference for private
ordering of disputes.
this would be a costly and serious impediment to the efficient organization of economic activity.”).
210. See supra note 59.
211. See Rhee, Price Theory, supra note 7, at 679–80 (arguing that cases go to trial when
parties are confident of their case assessments and thus there is the perception of outcome clarity);
Saks, supra note 5, at 1215 (“[A]mbiguity facilitates settlement.”). But see Priest & Klein, supra
note 1, at 16 (arguing that cases go to trial when the outcome is uncertain).
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As for litigation activity, negligence has no peer. In his highly
influential The Costs of Accidents, Guido Calabresi searched for an
alternative model.212 There, he dismissed the fault system as “absurd” and
“ineffective”213 and prescribed that a goal of an effective tort or
compensation system should be the reduction in the social costs of
accidents.214 He also prescribed that an effective compensation system
should provide a proper mix of market-based and government-initiated
incentives to reduce accidents to an optimal level.215 Despite the depth and
rigor of Calabresi’s insights, the fruition of these ambitious goals and
methods has been elusive.216 Instead, over the years negligence has
retrenched. In retrospect, it is easy to see why. An alternative system must
achieve a broad political consensus to fundamentally change the system,
as was the case for workers’ compensation, and this requires a better
balancing of the competing political, philosophical, and economic
interests. Until this alternative model is found, the fault standard will
continue to reign in the tort system.
More than any other legal standard or compensation system
contemplated, negligence is the legal standard that most reduces the
number of claims and their values. Strict liability would result in more
lawsuits and greater payouts. While an insurance system would reduce the
per case transaction cost, the aggregate administrative and liability costs
are unknown. As Saks notes:
A system that requires victims to initiate claims and puts
them through a complex process before compensation can be
paid will have far fewer claims filed than a system that
reduces these barriers. Consequently, defendant groups who
would like to experiment with no-fault or other types of
administrative systems fear that a major cost of
administrative expediency will be an increase in claims filed.
They worry that the number of currently litigated cases
constitutes only the tip of the injury iceberg and that in
exchange for whatever they are trying to avoid, they almost
certainly will see many more cases than they have
experienced in the past. For some areas of litigation, a
quintupling of cases would not be unexpected.217
212. CALABRESI, supra note 1. Calabresi’s book was the subject of a symposium held by the
Maryland Law Review. Symposium, Calabresi’s The Cost of Accidents: A Generation of Impact
on Law and Scholarship, 64 MD. L. REV. 1 (2005).
213. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 276, 316.
214. Id. at 24.
215. Id. at 27.
216. See Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV.
699, 733 (2005).
217. Saks, supra note 5, at 1189 (footnote omitted); see BAKER, supra note 15, at 26 (“[A] no-
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Strict liability and managed compensation result in far more claims
against defendants as the barriers and costs to recovery are lowered. Under
the fault standard, corporate defendants are allowed to impose a certain
degree of externalities from their activities onto the public.218 Whether
these externalities manifest into lawsuits depends on the calculus of harm
versus the total cost of dispute resolution. The fault standard increases this
cost and thereby reduces the number of claims and their values.
From the perspective of functionality, then, it is easy to see how
negligence is resistant to a coherent synthesis within the framework of the
current debate. Compensation will always be partial. Even in the fanciful
world of risk neutrality, the American rule of attorney fees assures this. In
the real world, efficiency, as defined by some, is impossible because the
standard of care envisioned by courts and economists cannot be achieved.
Corrective justice, as defined by others, is always incomplete when victims
cannot be made whole as envisioned by the legal standard. These
functionalities suggest that negligence is not the instrument of a
theoretically pure purpose but carries with it the attributes of practical
compromise within the larger political economy.219
The functionalities of negligence trace back to its historical origins.
Negligence did not begin to coalesce into a recognizable form until the
mid-nineteenth century.220 Accident law was then amorphous at best.221
fault approach [in the medical malpractice area] was almost guaranteed to be more expensive.”).
218. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 16 (2006) (stating that a corporation is “an entity that is guaranteed to
throw off as many costs and risks onto others as it can”). The doctrine governing recovery in cases
of increased risk of harm from toxic exposure perfectly illustrates the administrative problem of
uncompensated negative externalities. See generally Rhee, supra note 81 (arguing that recovery
should be allowed to compensate for increased risk of harm).
219. See E.F. Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ? An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory
Vein, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 191, 216 (1965) (“American negligence is ambivalent because it seeks to
perform two functions. One, it is designed to regulate human conduct by enforcing the reasonable
man standard. Two, it is becoming an insurance scheme . . . .”).
220. Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730–32 (1981).
221. There is significant scholarly disagreement on the state of the law before the rise of
negligence. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 351 (“Absolute liability was rejected; more accurately,
it was never considered.”); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 60
Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850) 1780–1860, at 85–90 (1977) (explaining that strict liability was the rule
before Brown v. Kendall); WHITE, supra note 3, at 14 (“[N]o comprehensive standard of liability
then existed for tort actions. . . . [Brown v. Kendall] was merely articulating the common sense of
earlier cases . . . .”); Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 960 (1981) (“[N]o-liability attitudes dominated many of the
status relationships that were to ripen into injury categories in the industrial era.”); Roberts, supra
note 219, at 204 (“In fact, Brown v. Kendall did not remove strict liability from the law: it was not
then there.”).
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The significance of Brown v. Kendall lies in its clear articulation of
negligence as a theory of liability.222 This theory was born into an era of
rapid industrialization and manufacturing,223 whose new activities
dramatically increased the number of personal injuries.224 The birth of
negligence as a coherent standard invites the question, why negligence? In
retrospect, American tort law could have adopted strict liability in the vein
of Rylands v. Fletcher,225 or, as Holmes suggested, a governmentsponsored insurance program.226 Yet it was negligence that emerged
naturally, without significant opposition, debate, or experimentation. Is
there a connection between the birth of negligence and the rise of the
American industrial age? Charles Gregory answered that negligence was
a judicial “subsidy” to a burgeoning industrial enterprise:
While it is pure speculation, one of Chief Justice Shaw’s
motives underlying his opinion [in Brown v. Kendall] appears
to have been a desire to make risk-creating enterprise less
hazardous to investors and entrepreneurs than it had been
previously at common law. Certainly that interpretation is
consistent with his having furthered the establishment of the
fellow servant doctrine and the expansion of the assumptionof-risk defense in actions arising out of industrial injuries.
Judicial subsidies of this sort to youthful enterprise removed
pressure from the pocket-books of investors and gave
incipient industry a chance to experiment on low-cost
operations without the risk of losing its reserve in actions by
injured employees. Such a policy no doubt seems ruthless;
but in a small way it probably helped to establish industry,
which in turn was essential to the good society as Shaw
envisaged it. And, of course, he also had in mind the obvious
advantages of consistency in legal theory.227

222. See Brown, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 296–97.
223. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, THE ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES 1790–1860, at
204 (1961) (“But it was during the 1840’s and early 1850’s that the pace of industrialization
accelerated to the degree that the Northeast could unequivocally be called a manufacturing
region.”).
224. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 2, at 1579; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 350
(“The Industrial Revolution added an appalling increase in dimension. The new machines had a
marvelous, unprecedented capacity for smashing the human body.”).
225. (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 265 (U.K.), aff’d, (1868) 3 L.R.H.L. 330 (U.K.); see FRIEDMAN,
supra note 5, at 365 (noting American judicial hostility to the strict-liability doctrine of Rylands
v. Fletcher).
226. See supra note 203 and accompanying quote; see also supra note 192 (describing the
reasons for the rise of workers’ compensation).
227. Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359,
368 (1951).
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Since Gregory’s speculation, the “subsidy” argument has been
vigorously debated by an impressive array of leading scholars. Legal
historians Morton Horwitz and Lawrence Friedman argued that the
development of the fault standard resulted in a wealth transfer from injured
plaintiffs to industry.228 Economists Posner and Landes argued that
negligence emerged as an effort to achieve economic efficiency.229 Tort
scholars are just as divergent in their views. Gary Schwartz took a more
generous view than the historians, arguing that negligence was applied
with “impressive sternness to major industries and that tort law exhibited
a keen concern for victim welfare.”230 Robert Rabin, on the other hand,
posited that the historical development of the negligence standard must be
viewed in the historical context, that is, that “if there was protectionism,
it was a natural consequence of deeply conservative, preexisting
sentiments toward loss allocation, rather than a retreat from a more liberal
compensation principle.”231
Regardless of these different opinions on the reason for the embrace of
negligence, there is little doubt that the effect has been the creation of
structural barriers to recovery. In early common law, the defenses of
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule
placed a significant onus of cost on plaintiffs. The early harsh rules lived
a short brilliant life, and the energy required to maintain them brought
about their eventual demise.232 They soon gave way to more equitable
standards. Statutory remedies were given to workers in occupations of
special risk. Comparative negligence took hold and eliminated the
preclusive effects of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
defenses. Workers’ compensation quickly replaced the tort system during
228. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 350–66; HORWITZ, supra note 221, at 63–108. Early
Supreme Court cases interpreting the Federal Employers’ Liability Act support the historians’
perspective. See, e.g., Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 58–59 (1943) (“[T]he general
impulse of common law courts at the beginning of this period [was] to insulate the employer as
much as possible from bearing the ‘human overhead’ which is an inevitable part of the cost—to
someone—of the doing of industrialized business.”).
229. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 8. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Economics
of Legal History, 67 MINN. L. REV. 645 (1983) (analyzing and comparing Posner’s and Horwitz’s
arguments on the historical development of tort law).
230. Schwartz, supra note 220, at 1720. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of
Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641 (1989) (arguing that nineteenth-century tort law
was generous to workers). Schwartz’s view of early tort law is not irreconcilable with those of
Horwitz and Friedman. The historians have portrayed the early tort system as a harsh machine of
economic oppression. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 356; HORWITZ, supra note 221, at 99–101.
But Friedman also noted that courts were not above the tug and pull of sympathy and fairness.
Early dispute resolution process, similar to today’s process, eliminated most claims even before
reaching trial. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 357. When cases reached the courts, however, judges
“were never entirely heartless,” and this sentiment “seemed to grow stronger with time.” Id. at 356.
231. Rabin, supra note 221, at 960.
232. Id. at 356, 366.
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the first half of the twentieth century. Free from its earlier draconian
tradition, the negligence system today is not so maligned as the Trojan
horse of industry. It is thought of in terms of fairness, moral
blameworthiness, and efficiency, which despite their tensions comport
with the humane sentiment of judging conduct through the prism of the
reasonable person. Yet the functionality of the negligence standard belies
the purity of this expression. The economics of negligence does not stand
in the perfect equipoise of the reasonably prudent person, and even without
the harshness of the old common law, the reason for the “unexpected
persistence” of negligence may still reside, in part at least, in the original
impetus behind its creation and adoption.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tort system operates under the large shadow of bargaining. Lawand-economics scholarship has assumed without exploration that courts set
the standard of care. It is true that they set the aspiration, but like much of
life the purity of ideal often confronts the messiness of reality. In fact, the
standard of care is set by the collective influence of private ordering
among victims and tortfeasors. These groups are not similarly situated, and
reasonable generalizations about their risk profiles naturally follow. There
are three different components to this profile: victims are more risk averse,
have greater opportunity cost, and are less diversified than tortfeasors. This
profile influences the economics of the bargaining process. Defendants
receive a discount to value that substantially funds the cost of accessing
the pricing mechanism. The effect of this cost arbitrage is a lower standard
of care than that predicted by the positive economic theory of tort law.
The theory of negligence is consistent with private contract theory and
the spirit of the American dispute resolution system. While a private
resolution can be seen as a good thing, at least in the abstract, it does not
equate to some idealized notion of fairness or equity. Basic economic
principles assure inequity. Corporate defendants have a lower cost of
resolution and extract a greater benefit in the contract process. Thus, they
are the primary beneficiaries of the negligence system, as was the case
when negligence was first conceived. Historically, negligence developed
in an era when the courts felt a need to shelter industry from a sudden
surge of injuries arising from America’s industrial transformation. As this
need subsided over time, negligence evolved into a more generous
standard, and most of its jagged edges have been smoothed over in time
with more humane sentiments. Today, negligence is cemented as the
predominant standard of accident law. One reason for this is that the fault
system, including its much-maligned cost structure, is the standard that
most preserves enterprise capital. Despite this disproportionate advantage,
one created by worldly circumstances on which the rule of law imparts an
effect, the fault system may have a redeeming feature. It is a compromise
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within the broader political economy. It maintains the essentially private
nature of tort law even as tort law must touch social policy and public
conscience. In its essence, the theory of negligence is deemed to better
promote a system of self-regulation of accidents in the shadow of
government pricing.

